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I. BACKGROUND 
Doubtless it will seem quirky or even perverse to begin in the Scottish Highlands 
a century before the Civil War and Reconstruction in the United States.  It did not 
seem so to Charles O’Conor, a prominent New York lawyer.  He used the 
suppression of the Scots rebels of 1745 by the Duke of Cumberland’s army in his 
1868 argument on behalf of Jefferson Davis, the former president of the 
Confederacy.1  It was used on a motion to quash an indictment for high treason.2   
American law in the mid-19th century was well rooted within an English legal 
heritage that provided rules and structure to the law of its former colonial 
possession.3  That heritage, however, was sometimes considered only to be rejected 
                                                                
 
 
*Professor Emeritus of History, Portland State University, Portland, Oregon; Joseph C. 
Hostetler-Baker & Hostetler Distinguished Visiting Professor of Legal History, Cleveland 
State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Spring 2006.  An earlier version of this 
Article entitled, Blackstone and Bayonets: Military Tribunals in the Reconstruction South, 
1865-1870, was presented at Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 
on April 11, 2006 as the Joseph C. Hostetler-Baker & Hostetler Distinguished Visiting 
Lecture. 
1BRADLEY T. JOHNSON, REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE IN THE 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 120-21 (Da Capo Press 1972) 
(1876). 
2See id. at 84-85. 
3It is pervasive in American case law, as well as in treatise writing.  One example is a 
remark made by Associate Justice Stephen J. Field of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
Slaughter-House Cases.  “The common law of England,” he wrote, “is the basis of 
jurisprudence in America.”  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 104 (1873). 
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in favor of norms more consistent with American republicanism than with the 
interests of the social hierarchy of England.  Whether cited as authority or as doctrine 
not applicable to American conditions, the fact remained that English law and 
English history remained strong influences in American courts. 
O’Conor’s reference was based on a volume published in 1761.  It was on the 
Pleas of the Crown by Sir Michael Foster.4  It included proceedings against the 
leaders of the Scots clans tried for high treason following their defeat at the battle of 
Culloden.  The treatment was ruthless—wounded Highlanders were left on the field 
for days unattended, and those who fled were chased down and killed.  
Subsequently, the troops were used to scour the home areas of the rebels to eliminate 
them root and branch.  Law was also used.  Nearly 3,000 rebels were tried in special 
commission trials and 120 were put to death.  Clan leaders were beheaded, their 
property seized.  Lesser clan figures were sentenced to be hanged, beheaded, and 
disemboweled with the innards burned before their eyes.5  This was well known to 
Americans who could know the gory history from Foster’s work.  If they did not 
read that source, they had an even more direct source because many of the 
Highlanders were transported to the North American colonies.6  Whatever the 
source, Americans were determined to craft a fundamental law that would make the 
horrors in the Highlands an impossibility in the newly independent United States.  
Rights appearing in the Bill of Rights—especially in the 5th and 6th Amendments—
were the result.7  At least that was O’Conor’s argument. 
Those who believed in American exceptionalism then tried to escape “political 
justice.”  Chief Justice John Marshall captured the idea in Marbury v. Madison.8  He 
loftily referred to the rule of “laws and not of men.”9  But, he still made a place for 
the cow-bird of politics.  Questions in their nature political would not be considered 
by the justices.10  Marshall’s “political questions” doctrine has included a reluctance 
to challenge the executive during war.11 Such reluctance has been subsumed under 
                                                                
 
 
4MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE TRIAL 
OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 (London, E. and R. Brooke, 3d ed. 1792) (1761). 
5GEOFFREY PLANK, REBELLION AND SAVAGERY: THE JACOBITE RISING OF 1745 AND THE 
BRITISH EMPIRE 53-76 (2006);  W. A. SPECK, THE BUTCHER: THE DUKE OF CUMBERLAND AND 
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 45, at 141-47 (1981).  One of the most infamous executions of a clan 
leader was the beheading in the Tower of London of Lord Lovat, a seventy-eight year old man 
betrayed by his son.  See TRIAL OF SIMON, LORD LOVAT OF THE ’45, at 299 (David N. Mackay 
ed., 1911); see also PLANK, supra, at 75-76. 
6PLANK, supra note 5, at 155-180. 
7JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 121.  
8Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  
9Id. at 163.  
10Id. at 166. 
11Political questions have broken down as a tool of constitutional interpretation.  One 
significant step came in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where the court adopted the 
notion that the right to vote was a constitutionally protected right through the equal   
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the notion of “state necessity,” that is, that the continued existence of the state 
depends on deviation from ordinary law.  Deviations are often defended by the 
notions of emergency or necessity.  Sometimes this means military trials of civilians, 
and in some states the ordinary civil courts will do. 
It is an especially dangerous moment when political justice coexists with or gives 
meaning to the notion of the rule of law.  Rule of law is appealing, but it is deceptive.  
The idea has not been confined within the boundaries of a definition.  The problem 
of the definition of the rule of law has been intertwined with the question of the 
definition of sovereignty, and with the question of the sovereign, the possessor of 
sovereignty.  At bottom, the problem concerns the source of legitimacy of a legal 
order.  Carl Schmitt, a brilliant German scholar, claimed that he who “decides the 
exception” is the sovereign.12  Tragically, it was a definition the Nazis found 
congenial.  The fluidity of the notion of rule of law has created considerable 
skepticism, even while it remains a breakwater against arbitrary, capricious rule. 
John Philip Reid, no opponent of the notion of liberty under law, for instance, 
opened his study of the idea of the rule of law with a warning that the subject was 
filled with “jurisprudential ambiguity and the treacherous underfooting [sic] of 
imprecise definition.”13  Brian Tamanaha has also noted that it is an idea with many 
meanings and that today there is a “marked deterioration of the rule of law in the 
West” alongside the “ever-present danger of becoming rule by judges and lawyers.”14 
                                                          
 
 
protection clause of the 14th Amendment.  It infused republicanism with a heavy dose of 
democracy, eventually spurring the popular principle of “one man one vote.”  See Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (“[A]ll who participate in the election are to have an equal 
vote”).  A good illustration of the earlier deference when the question appeared to be political 
is reflected in a remark made by Associate Justice David Davis in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 
(4 Wall.) 2, 109 (1866).  “During the late wicked rebellion,” he wrote, “the temper of the times 
did not allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion 
of a purely judicial question.”  Id. at 109. Although he claimed that “rights” were involved, he 
allowed the violence of war to set them aside temporarily.  Legal reasoning might well lack 
sufficient authority during the distemper of war.  ‘The question before the court was 
profoundly significant—it involved “the very framework of the government and the 
fundamental principles of American liberty.”  Id. One of those “principles” he framed in a 
powerful voice: “The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally 
in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, 
and under all circumstances.”  Id. at 120-21. 
12NASSER HUSSAIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY: COLONIALISM AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 15 (2003).   
13JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 3 (2004). 
14BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 4-5 (2004).  
There is a huge body of literature on the notion of the rule of law.  The theoretical issues can 
be approached through THE RULE OF LAW  (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971), BLANDINE KRIEGEL, 
THE STATE AND THE  RULE OF LAW (Thomas Pavel & Mark Lilla eds., Marc A LePain & 
Jeffrey C. Cohen trans., 1995), and RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA (2001).  
Studies into the historical experience people have had with the notion can begin profitably in 
17th century England.  Once again, the literature is large, but the reader can start with JAMES 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
514 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:511 
 
 
Moreover, the prospect of rule by judges is not always welcome.  An example is 
Latin America, “where the judiciary is [often] seen as “sympathetic to the propertied 
elite.”15 Among the most ominous historical examples would be the political trials in 
Weimar Germany.  The pro-Hitlerian trials were a prelude to the crude trials in the 
Volksgerichthof (the National Socialist People’s Courts).16 
  One of the most blatant uses of law for political purposes in Britain before 
the American Civil War were the trials of Irish nationalists.  The trial of Robert 
Emmet (a case cited in American cases during Reconstruction) will serve as an 
example.  His trial in Dublin in 1803 followed a bumbled attempt to establish an 
independent Ireland.  The English Attorney General made an opening statement so 
full of antirevolutionary invective it could have been written by Edmund Burke, the 
brilliant English conservative.17  The Attorney General claimed that the crime of high 
treason was aggravated in Emmet’s case “[w]hen we consider the state of Europe, 
and the lamentable consequences which the French revolution has already brought 
upon it.”18  The times were filled with “social disease.”  Perhaps in “former periods,” 
he continued, “some allowance might be made for the heated imaginations of 
enthusiasts; perhaps an extravagant love of liberty might for a moment supersede a 
rational understanding . . . .  But sad experience has taught us, that modern 
revolution is not the road to liberty.”19  Mr. Plunkett, co-prosecutor, picked up the 
gauntlet for the Crown and added, “Liberty and equality are dangerous names to 
make use of.”20  “[I]f properly understood,” he continued,  
they mean enjoyment of personal freedom under the equal protection of 
the laws . . . .  But in the cant of modern philosophy . . . the ennobling 
distinctions of man’s nature are all thrown aside . . . .  He is taught not to 
startle at putting to death a fellow creature, if it be represented as a mode 
of contributing to the good of all.21   
                                                          
 
 
S. HART, JR., THE RULE OF LAW 1603-1660: CROWNS, COURTS AND JUDGES (2003), and 
CHRISTOPHER HILL, LIBERTY AGAINST THE LAW: SOME SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
CONTROVERSIES (1996). 
15TAMANAHA, supra note 14, at 125. 
16H. W. KOCH, IN THE NAME OF THE VOLK: POLITICAL JUSTICE IN HITLER’S GERMANY 51-
66 (1989); see also INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991); 
NIKOLAUS WACHSMANN, HITLER’S PRISONS: LEGAL TERROR IN NAZI GERMANY (2004). 
17See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.C.D. Clark ed., 
Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790). 
18Proceedings on the Trial of Robert Emmet Esq. for High Treason, in 28 A COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 1097, 1111 (Thomas Jones 
Howell ed., London, T.C. Hansard for Longman et al. 1820).  
19Id. 
20Id. at 1167. 
21Id.  
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The jurors found Emmet guilty without leaving the jury box and he was executed the 
next day.22 
One final sample of a British imperial case is one cited often in Military 
Commission trials in the South after the Civil War.  This was the case of the 
Reverend John Smith executed in Demerara in the early 1820s after a trial by a 
military tribunal for allegedly advising slaves to revolt.23  In this trial, leading 
questions were allowed.24  This case was soundly condemned in a Parliamentary 
debate in 1824, which, in turn, was cited in Reconstruction era cases. 
From the savage suppression of the Highlanders to the death of the Reverend 
Smith, such deviations from English common law were defended in the name of 
“state necessity.”  W. F. Finlason, a leading commentator on martial law began with 
the observation that “[f]rom times coeval with the very origin of our liberties” the 
Crown had exercised the right to wage war and “exercise its severities, against 
rebels.”25  His work, Commentaries upon Martial Law, was written in response to 
executions in Jamaica that occurred in 1865 after an alleged insurrection in Morant 
Bay.  He was, in general, a supporter of necessary deviation from ordinary rules of 
law in the face of insurrection.26 
Others were more critical, such as Frederic Harrison, who wrote a number of 
letters to the London Daily News about what he found on the island.  Martial law, he 
                                                                
 
 
22Id. at 1177. 
23THE LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY’S REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE LATE 
REV. J. SMITH, OF DEMERARA 2 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1824) (detailing the prosecution of 
Rev. Smith, Minister of the Gospel, who was tried under Martial Law); 2 SPEECHES OF HENRY 
LORD BROUGHAM, UPON QUESTIONS RELATING TO PUBLIC RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND INTERESTS; 
WITH HISTORICAL INTRODUCTIONS, AND A CRITICAL DISSERTATION UPON THE ELOQUENCE OF 
THE ANCIENTS (Edinburgh, Adam & Charles Black 1838); see also EMILIA VIOTTI DA COSTA, 
CROWNS OF GLORY, TEARS OF BLOOD: THE DEMERARA SLAVE REBELLION OF 1823, at 252 
(1994) (claiming that “there is plenty of evidence that the trial was staged to convict the 
missionary”). 
24Many examples of leading questions are seen throughout the report of the law.  See THE 
LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY’S REPORT, supra note 23, at 9, 11, 18, 21, 51, 57, 61, 93, 96-97, 
99, 102, 113, 116, 118, 121, 126-27, 131. 
25W. F. FINLASON, COMMENTARIES UPON MARTIAL LAW, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS 
REGULATION AND RESTRAINT; WITH AN INTRODUCTION, CONTAINING COMMENTS UPON THE 
CHARGE OF THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE IN THE JAMAICA CASE 1 (London, Stevens and Sons, 
1867). 
26Id. at 18-19. He asserted that a declaration of martial law  
could only be justified by necessity . . . yet that when declared by supreme authority, it 
had legal existence; and that the lawfulness of individual acts in the execution of it, 
depended on the principle of authority; and that, therefore, all acts done within the 
declared district, under military orders, were legal, at all events, if done honestly; and 
that, in particular as regarded trials by court-martial, it was enough if they were 
governed, not by the formal rules of common law trials, but by the substantial 
principles of natural justice.   
Id. 
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wrote, was but “mob law” or “lynch law.”27  Some islanders, he even suggested, 
argued that martial law had “always been known in the island . . . as a time of legal 
license, a period for the lawful putting to death of black men by white.”28 
The use of martial law was part of a constitutional and legal crisis within the 
Anglo-American world of the mid-19th century, a crisis that framed the struggle to 
end racial slavery and all the “badges of servitude.”29  The constitutional crisis in the 
United States involved a bitter struggle over the expansion of slavery to the territory 
acquired in the war with Mexico.30 It also involved hostile state laws that affected 
slaveowners traveling through the free states of the North and the increasingly 
contentious relationship between the federal fugitive slave laws and personal liberty 
laws of the Northern states.31 Comity was broken down as the country moved toward 
war. 
When Confederates fired on Fort Sumter, and the country bloodied itself in one 
of the worst cases of carnage of the century, martial law often moved along with the 
armies. What exactly was martial law?  Sir Matthew Hale proclaimed that “Martial 
Law” was “not a law,”32 and Sir William Blackstone endorsed the same view in his 
mid-18th century treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England.  That four volume 
                                                                
 
 
27FREDERIC HARRISON, MARTIAL LAW: SIX LETTERS TO THE “DAILY NEWS” (London, 
Jamaica Committee, 1867) (number 5 in the Jamaica Papers series) (copy on file in the 
British Library).  
28Id.  The best overall account of the episode can be found in THOMAS C. HOLT, THE 
PROBLEM OF FREEDOM: RACE, LABOR AND POLITICS IN JAMAICA AND BRITAIN 1832-1938 
(1992). 
29The phrase “badge of servitude” referred to the continued existence of the oppressive 
and discriminatory laws attached to the freedmen. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
36, 92 (1873).  This phrase permeates post-Civil War law.  For example, Justice Field reports 
it being used by Senator Lyman Trumbull when talking about the Civil Rights bill of 1866.  
Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474 (1866)). 
30DON FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS (1978); Arthur Bestor, State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of 
Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860, 54 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 117-80 (1961). 
31PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981); 
THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 1780-1860 
(1974). 
32MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 26 (Charles M. Gray 
ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1713).  Hale’s work is the starting point for many jurists 
and commentators.  It should be used with caution.  Hale throws together concepts that today 
are kept separate.  His opening remark is often all that is cited: “That in Truth and Reality it 
[martial law] is not a law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law . . . .”  Id. at 26.  
The rest of the sentence is this: “[T]he Necessity of Government, Order and Discipline in an 
Army, is that only which can give those Laws a Countenance . . . .”  Id.  Then Hale said of 
martial law in general: “This indulged Law was only to extend to Members of the Army, or to 
those of the opposite Army . . . .” Id.  A distinction made later—between military law and 
martial law—does not appear in Hale’s book. 
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treatise was the primary source of legal education in the United States before the 
Civil War.33  But, the most widely quoted definition of martial law was that of the 
Duke of Wellington at the time of the Peninsular War against Napoleon.  It was 
nothing more or less than the “will of the commander.”34 
One highly regarded commentator was Brevet Colonel W. W. Winthrop.  In the 
1880 edition of his work, A Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the 
Army with Notes, he described the military commissions that acted under martial law 
as “simply criminal war courts.”35  Seventy years later, in a U.S. Supreme Court 
case, Madsden v. Kinsella, Associate Justice Harold H. Burton called military 
commissions “our common law war courts.”36 
American cases involving martial law are filled with references to English 
experiences. The War of 1812 produced some of the first uses of martial law in 
American experience.37  A landmark case emerged out of the Dorr War in Rhode 
Island in the early 1840s.38  The Dorrites claimed to have replaced the existing Whig 
government, which rested on an extremely narrow suffrage of property holders.  The 
Dorrites drafted a new constitution and elected new state officers without authority 
from the existing government.  Their ideological justification was revolutionary 
constitutionalism, that is, the right of the sovereign people to alter or abolish the 
government at will.39  The Whig government responded with the suspension of the 
                                                                
 
 
33WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1765-69).   
34The definition given by the Duke of Wellington appears in nearly all studies of martial 
law.  Among the studies of martial law that have been the most influential are the following: 
ROBERT S. RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS: MARTIAL LAW AND ITS LEGAL BASIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 4 (1939); CHARLES M. CLODE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER 
MILITARY AND MARTIAL LAW (London, John Murray 1872); WILLIAM BIRKHIMER, MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW (Wash., James J. Chapman 1892); CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE 
LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (2d  ed. 1943).  One other I would mention is the treatise published in 
the Confederacy: CHARLES HENRY LEE, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE’S VADE MECUM: EMBRACING A 
GENERAL VIEW OF MILITARY LAW, AND THE PRACTICE BEFORE COURTS MARTIAL, WITH AN 
EPITOME OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, AS APPLICABLE TO MILITARY TRIALS (Richmond, West & 
Johnston 1863). 
35WILLIAM W. WINTHROP, JUDGE-ADVOCATE GENERAL’S DEPT., A DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF 
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WITH NOTES 325 (Washington, Gov’t Printing 
Office, 1880).  
36Masden v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1952) (footnote omitted).  He added that they 
had been called by several different names: “Military Commission, Council of War, Military 
Tribunal, Military Government Court, Provisional Court, Provost Court, Court of Conciliation, 
Arbitrator, Superior Court, and Appellate Court.”  Id. at 347 & n.11. 
37See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 52-3 (1866) (describing the imposition of 
martial law in New Orleans during the 1815 seige). 
38Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
39GEORGE DENNISON, THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL, 1831-1861 (1976); see 
also WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U. S. CONSTITUTION 87-110 
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writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law over the whole state.  The 
uprising collapsed early but the complete end did not come until 1849 in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case of Luther v. Borden.40  An especially strong condemnation of 
martial law came in the concurring opinion of Associate Justice Levi Woodbury.  He 
nearly sickened at the thought that a citizen could be tried and “hung up” to the 
nearest lamppost after a “trial” in a “drum-head court-martial.”41 
Another historical milepost came during the Mexican war.  In 1847, General 
Phillip Kearney imposed martial law in the area of Mexico occupied by the U.S. 
army under his command.  The purpose was to maintain order and serve in place of 
civil authorities whose rule had collapsed.  He did not set out to remodel the law of 
Mexico.42  This experience with martial law was used as a precedent throughout the 
Civil War and Reconstruction to establish the legitimacy of military rule under some 
emergency circumstances. 
Legitimacy is a bedrock problem in political theory.  It raises a presumption that 
the people subject to a given rule, including military rule, owe obedience to that rule.  
On the other side, the events of the clans in Scotland raise the question of the limits 
of obedience.  The English, following Culloden, used the military not to end 
disorder, but to put an end to a style of life that contained within it the seedbed for 
discontent and insurrection. 
A series of laws were adopted by the British and applied to Scotland that 
destroyed the world of the clans, a world closer to feudalism than to modernity.  The 
laws prohibited the wearing of plaids and the possession of arms, and undermined 
the old land tenures and the unique private forms of justice.43 
                                                          
 
 
(2004); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION: A STUDY IN AMERICAN RADICALISM, 
1833-1849 (1973). 
40Luther, 48 U.S. 1. 
41Id. at 62. 
42MARK J. STEGMAIER,  TEXAS, NEW MEXICO, AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850: BOUNDARY 
DISPUTE & SECTIONAL CRISIS  (1996). 
43The question of legitimacy is one of the crucial questions in political philosophy.  One of 
the sharpest debates occurred among German thinkers in the years between the World Wars.  
It can be followed in the work of the authoritarian thinker Carl Schmitt.  See, e.g., CARL 
SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer, ed., trans., Duke Univ. Press 2004) 
(1932); DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND 
HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997); THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF 
FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (William E. Scheuerman, ed., 1996).  There was 
an interesting precedent for such a debate.  It was provoked by the rising in the Scots 
Highlands.  Plank noted, for instance, that “Britain’s soldiers in 1745 were fighting in the 
presence of philosophers.”  PLANK, supra note 5, at 106 (footnote omitted).  Writers gave 
consideration to such questions as loyalty owed.  The English laws dealt with a wide variety of 
Scottish norms.  “Wardholding,” for instance, was abolished in 1747.  It was a feudal remnant.  
It was a “customary practice which had traditionally placed tenants under an obligation to 
perform military service for their superiors.”  Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).  What were called 
“heritable jurisdictions” whereby the Highland aristocracy had held their own law courts were 
abolished as well.  Id. (footnote omitted).  Moreover, a decade long effort began after 
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Military force and the law of the conqueror ended a way of life in the Highlands, 
and something similar happened to the slave-based societies of the so-called Old 
South.  In place of both, a modern alternative was introduced—the legal and 
equitable rules of market capitalism.  In both cases, on the other side, there was a 
significant claim. David Hume, the towering Scottish philosopher, summarized it in 
a brief essay, Of Passive Obedience, as follows: “[G]overnment binds us to 
obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, [but] that duty must 
always, in extraordinary cases, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, 
yield to the primary and original obligation.  Salus populi suprema Lex, the safety of 
the people is the supreme law.”44  The use of violence to establish or reestablish a 
social order would have its claims.  Hume feared that the pretensions of the Stuarts 
to royal authority “are not yet antiquated; and who can foretell, that their future 
attempts will produce no greater disorder?”45  His concern for the future was based 
on the past in which, he noted, “We have had two rebellions . . . besides plots and 
conspiracies without number.”46  The uprising of 1745-46 was the last of the 
upheavals.47  The future in the American South was likewise filled with possibilities 
for violence, especially because of the virulent racism in the region. 
The first massive change in the defeated Confederacy was the total eradication of 
racial slavery.  Exactly when it ended and by what authority are not easy questions to 
answer.  Did slavery end legally on January 1, 1863, with the Emancipation 
Proclamation, or did it end only when the army gave it substance with the defeat of 
the Confederate armies and the occupation of the South?  Did it end with the 
Southern white’s constitutional recognition of its end?  In most of the South, that 
would mean it ended under presidential Reconstruction in late 1865.  Or did it end 
only in December 1865 with the ratification of the 13th Amendment?48 
                                                          
 
 
Culloden “to reform the character of Gaelic-speakers and integrate their region more fully into 
Britain’s political structure and the world of commercial exchange.”  Id. at 103 (footnote 
omitted). 
44David Hume, Of Passive Obedience, in HUME: POLITICAL ESSAYS 202, 202 (Knud 
Haakonssen ed., 1994) (1777).  Of Passive Obedience was written in 1748.  
45David Hume, Of the Protestant Succession, in HUME: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 44, 
at 213, 218.  Of the Protestant Succession was written in 1752.  
46Id at 217.  
47Id. at 325 n.2. 
48In Mitchell v. De Schamps, 34 S.C. Eq. (13 Rich. Eq.) 9 (1866), South Carolina’s Judges 
Benjamin F. Dunkin (majority), David L. Wardlaw and John A. Inglis (concurring) angrily 
rejected the notion that the Emancipation Proclamation ended slavery as of January 1, 1863.   
[I]t is preposterous to attribute such effect to the mere proclamation of President 
Lincoln.  The consequences of such a doctrine would be fraught with ruin and disaster 
to the southern people.  Proceedings in the Courts would at once spring up, and in 
fearful profusion, at the suit of the freedman against the white, to recover wages for 
labor since 1st January, 1863, and damages for false imprisonments, assaults and 
batteries, trespasses and other injuries to the person and property of the freedman.  The 
result would be, that all transactions affecting slaves, since 1st January, 1863, all 
contracts for their hire, purchase or sale, and all partitions and divisions of estates, 
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Lawful violence had always been a central element of the social order of the 
slave-based societies of the South.  It was fitting perhaps that that world ended in 
violence.  South Carolinians, for example, declared in the constitution they adopted 
under presidential authority that slavery had ended by federal force.  The state’s 
highest court ruled thereafter that slavery ended by the will of the federal generals in 
the spring of 1865.  Violence, nonetheless, remained a part of the world of South 
Carolinians.  In 1872, Major Lewis Merrill, in command of federal troops in the 
KKK infested upcountry of the state, reported that, “in my experience [South 
Carolina] has no parallel, either in wanton and brutal cruelties inflicted . . . or in the 
utter deadening of the moral sense in large parts of white communities reputed and 
believed to be far removed from the barbarism of savages.”49  The objective of the 
white violence, in his view, was “to make a salvage of the wreck of rebellion.”50  In 
time, of course, violence carried the day for white supremacists. 
II. MILITARY RULE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1865-1866 
The end of chattel slavery in South Carolina came in the spring of 1865, under 
the authority of the generals, according to the state supreme court.  Civil authority, 
moreover, ceased with the collapse of the Confederacy even though it was not 
always clear to the former Confederate office-holders.  K. G. Billips is an example.  
As late as January 9, 1866, he wrote to Governor James L. Orr to report a case of 
“interposition” by the military with a “regular civil process” in Lancaster Court 
House.51  He identified himself as a Commissioner in Equity “holding a commission 
from the Governor of the state.”52  When he tried to exercise his authority under the 
law of South Carolina he was informed by the officer in command that “there is no 
civil law in force here.”53 
One of the first demands on the federal military was to provide order.  They also 
oversaw the process central to President Andrew Johnson’s Reconstruction policy—
                                                          
 
 
wherein slaves were given or received in lieu of money or other property, would be at 
once annulled, and, . . . “be swept pell-mell into chaos.”  
Id. at 12 (quoting Sheffey, J., of Virginia). ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION 
PROCLAMATION: THE END OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA (2004), and MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL 
FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(2001), deal with other roads to freedom. A superior volume that shows the piecemeal collapse 
of slavery during the war is 1 FREEDOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION 1861-
1867 (Ira Berlin et al. eds., 1985).  
49Letter from Lewis Merrill, Major, to Adjutant General (Jan. 14, 1872) (on file with the 
United States National Archives, Record Group 94, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 
1780s-1917, Letters Received, Adjutant General, M666, reel 26).  
50Id.  
51Letter from K. G. Billips, Commissioner in Equity, State of South Carolina, to James L. 
Orr, Governor, State of South Carolina (Jan. 9, 1866) (on file with the South Carolina 
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the administration of the oaths of allegiance that policy required.54  They also had to 
play a role in the introduction of new legal norms to replace the claims of whites to 
the absolute ownership of the labor and faculties of another.  That meant, in practice, 
that the military had to oversee the introduction of a contract relationship, and 
contract theory held that the worker could sell or withhold his labor power in a free 
market.  That was the theory, but it was a theory many white South Carolinians 
thought the freedmen were unable or unwilling to understand.  Some even claimed 
sympathy for blacks.  Julius Fleming, for instance, wrote to the Charleston Courier 
in July 1865 that “[t]he Negroes are to be pitied. . . . They do not understand the 
liberty which has been conferred upon them.  A freedom which still involves the 
necessity of earning their bread by the sweat of their brow does not seem to them 
much of a boon after all.”55 
It is clear enough that the Freedmen hoped and expected to become a small 
farming peasantry, at least during 1865 when the prospect of owning land seemed 
realistic.56  It was a hollow expectation as it turned out, especially since the pardon 
and amnesty program of the President, resting on the oaths of allegiance, carried with 
it the full restoration of all property rights, except for slaves.57  In the end, the 
Freedmen were pushed into signing contracts by military and Freedmen’s Bureau 
personnel.58  For the most part, the contracts of 1865 were for shares of the crop, and 
                                                                
 
 
54ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960), remains one of 
the best overall studies of Johnsonian Reconstruction. On the significance of oaths the work of 
Harold Hyman is unsurpassed.  There are two studies: HAROLD M. HYMAN, ERA OF THE OATH: 
NORTHERN LOYALTY TESTS DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1954), and the 
more general, HAROLD M. HYMAN, TO TRY MEN’S SOULS: LOYALTY TESTS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (1959).  The oath promulgated by President Johnson was as follows:  
I, ______ ______, do solemnly swear, (or affirm,) in presence of Almighty God, that I will 
henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, 
and the union of the States thereunder, and that I will, in like manner, abide by, and 
faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing 
rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves. So help me God. 
Andrew Johnson, Amnesty Proclamation (May 29, 1865), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW 
JOHNSON, at 128, 129 (Paul H. Bergeron ed., 1989). 
55THE JUHL LETTERS TO THE CHARLESTON COURIER: A VIEW OF THE SOUTH, 1865-1871, at 
20 (John Hammond Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter THE JUHL LETTERS]. 
56This is a subject filled with thoughtful scholarship.  One excellent starting point is 
ESSAYS ON THE POSTBELLUM SOUTHERN ECONOMY (Thavolia Glymph & John J. Kushma eds., 
1985). 
57JONATHAN TRUMAN DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON: THE 
RESTORATION OF THE CONFEDERATES TO THEIR RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES, 1861-1898, at 34 
(1953). 
58The precise relationship between the army and the Freedmen’s Bureau (staffed in large 
measure by military personnel) was often unclear.  GEORGE BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE 
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU 149-50 (1955); MARTIN ABBOTT, THE FREEDMEN ‘S BUREAU IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 1865-1872 (1967).  In a letter marked “highly confidential,” Letter from Oliver 
Otis Howard, Commissioner, Freedmen’s Bureau, to R. K. Scott, Brevet Major General 
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they often stipulated that the farm worker would be obedient, diligent, honest, sober, 
and so on.  At the heart of these early contracts was the idea that labor had to be, and 
ought to be, under heavy constraints.  As John William DeForest, a Bureau agent, 
                                                          
 
 
(January 30, 1867) (on file with the United States National Archives, Record Group 105, 
Records of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, reel 13), Howard was 
trying, without success, to find a test case to take to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The section of 
the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 that raised questions for Howard was as follows:  
That in every State or district where the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has 
been interrupted by the rebellion, and until the same shall be fully restored, and in 
every State or district whose constitutional relations to the government have been 
practically discontinued by the rebellion, and until such State shall have . . . the right 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to have full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal 
security, and the acquisition, enjoyment and disposition of estate, real and personal, 
including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all 
the citizens of such State or district without respect to race or color, or previous 
condition of slavery.  And whenever in either of said States or districts the ordinary 
course of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, and until the same 
shall be fully restored, and until such State shall have been restored in its 
constitutional relations to the government, and shall be duly represented in the 
Congress of the United States, the President shall, through the commissioner and the 
officers of the bureau, and under such rules and regulations as the President, through 
the Secretary of War, shall prescribe, extend military protection and have military 
jurisdiction over all cases and questions concerning the free enjoyment of such 
immunities and rights, and no penalty or punishment for any violation of law shall be 
imposed or permitted because of race or color, or previous condition of slavery, other 
or greater than the penalty or punishment to which white persons may be liable by law 
for the like offence.  But the jurisdiction conferred by this section upon the officers of 
the bureau shall not exist in any State where the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings has not been interrupted by the rebellion, and shall cease in every State 
when the courts of the State and the United States are not disturbed in the peaceable 
course of justice, and after such State shall be fully restored in its constitutional 
relations to the government, and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the 
United States.  
Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, ch. 200, §14, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77.  See also Letter from     
D. T. Corbin to Edward L. Deane, Major & Acting Adjutant General (Feb 6, 1867) (on file 
with the United States National Archives, Record Group 105, Records of the Bureau of 
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, reel 13).  Corbin was with the Freedmen’s 
Bureau during 1866 and held several crucial positions during radical reconstruction, during 
which time he was a major figure fighting the Ku Klux Klan.  For practice in the courts set up 
by the Bureau see Thomas D. Morris, Equality, ‘Extraordinary Law,’ and Criminal Justice: 
The South Carolina Experience, 1865-1866, 83 S. C. HIST. MAGAZINE 15 (1982); DONALD G. 
NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF 
BLACKS, 1865-1868 (1979); James Oakes, A Failure of Vision: The Collapse of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Courts, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 66 (1979). 
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put it: “Many of the planters seemed to be unable to understand that work could be 
other than a form of slavery.”59 
By January 1866, a new set of contracts had to be negotiated and the military had 
to approve them as in 1865.  General Daniel Sickles, in command in South Carolina, 
issued a General Order on January 1, to provide guidelines that the military would 
enforce.  The intent, he wrote, was to ensure that the rights of “employer and the free 
laborer” were defined and respected, and “the system of free labor undertaken . . . the 
owners of the estates may be secured in their possession of their lands and tenements 
. . . persons able and willing to work may find employment . . . idleness and 
vagrancy may be discountenanced and encouragement given to industry and thrift.”60 
Parallel with the introduction of contract labor came the substitution of military 
justice in place of the void left with the collapse of the Confederacy.  Much of it was 
in provost courts originally set up by General Quincy Gillmore in 1865, while some 
of it was in the higher level Military Commissions.  These military courts functioned 
alongside the civil courts that were in place and functioning.  By the fall of 1866, 
General Sickles, who had replaced Gillmore, turned the cases currently in the 
military courts over to the civil courts of the provisional governments set up earlier 
under Presidential authority.61 
Generally, the primary function of these early military courts was to establish 
order, and they were not always staffed by people who knew law.  On the other hand, 
some members of these courts were knowledgeable of the law.  In the Orangeburg 
County provost court, for instance, the members dealt with cases begun through 
common law forms of action.  There were cases dealing with assumpsit in contract 
disputes and in actions for debts.62  One of the primary responsibilities of the provost 
courts was to provide a legal forum in which Freedmen could receive a fair-minded 
justice, as reports from the South made it clear they could not expect it in Southern 
courts. 
Did they succeed in that first year or so?  General O. O. Howard, the head of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau evaluated those courts this way (and I believe he was correct):  
In the great majority of instances, the provost courts decided fairly; but 
there were some where the officers composing them had the infectious 
prejudice against the negro, and discriminated against his interest; they 
                                                                
 
 
59JOHN WILLIAM DEFOREST, A UNION OFFICER IN THE RECONSTRUCTION 28 (James H. 
Croushore & David M. Potter eds., 1948).  At the same time, he wrote that “[m]ost of the 
difficulties between whites and blacks resulted from the inevitable awkwardness of tyros in 
the mystery of free labor.”  Id. at 28. 
60JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE TO WORK: LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1815-1880, at 141 (1998). 
61JAMES E. SEFTON, THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at 30-
32, 98, 255 (1967). 
62The cases are on file with the United States National Archives, Record Group 105, 
Records of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, South Carolina, vol. 
255, Trials, Orangeburg Provost Court. 
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invariably meted out to those who abused him by extortion or violence, 
punishments too small and in no way commensurate with their offenses.63   
The warmest endorsement of the work of the early courts is that of the historian 
James Sefton: “The generals,” he wrote, “were quick to proclaim whites and Negroes 
equal before the law and also quick to enforce that equality.”64 
1865 was a year of disorder, legal confusion, violence, and even starvation. 
Sydney Andrews, a Northern correspondent, described Charleston (at about the time 
Presidential Reconstruction commenced) as a “city of ruins, of desolation, of vacant 
houses, of widowed women, of rotting wharves, of deserted ware-houses, of miles of 
grass-grown streets, of acres of pitiful and voiceless barrenness.”65  One 
Charlestonian admitted that “‘[y]ou won’t see the real sentiment of our people, for 
we are under military rule; we are whipped, and we are going to make the best of 
things; but we hate Massachusetts as much as we ever did.’”66 
“Juhl” had a slightly different view.  On March 20, 1866, he wrote to the Courier 
as follows: “The present state of things is decidedly anomalous and hurtful; wheels 
within wheels, Blackstone hemmed with bayonets, and clients and counsel sadly 
bewildered.”67  Still, some things were clear.  Martial law would end only with some 
major transformations in the institutional arrangements of South Carolina.  “Let the 
same courts and the same laws,” he observed, “take cognizance of crimes in both 
races alike, and justice be impartially meted out to all . . . .”68  Such calls for equality 
                                                                
 
 
632 OLIVER OTIS HOWARD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER OTIS HOWARD, MAJOR GENERAL 
UNITED STATES ARMY 253 (1908). 
64SEFTON, supra note 61, at 44. 
65SIDNEY ANDREWS, THE SOUTH SINCE THE WAR 1 (Louisiana State Univ. Press 2004) 
(1866).  John C. Calhoun was by all accounts the intellectual leader of South Carolina, if not 
the South in general, in its move toward secession and war.  Andrews described a powerful 
symbol in Charleston of the destroyed world of the Carolinians:  
Down in the churchyard of St. Phillip’s, one of the richest and most aristocratic of 
churches in this proud city, is a grave which every stranger is curious to see.  It is the 
grave of the father of the Rebellion, and on the marble slab there is cut the one 
word,—  
                                                        “CALHOUN.” 
This churchyard symbolizes the city of Charleston. Children and goats crawl through a 
convenient hole in the front wall, and play at will among the sunken graves and 
broken tombstones.  There is everywhere a wealth of garbage and beef-bones.  A 
mangy cur was slinking among the stones, and I found a hole three feet deep which he 
had dug at the foot of one of the graves.  Children were quarrelling for flowers over 
one of the more recent mounds.  The whole yard is grown up to weeds and brush, and 
the place is desolate and dreary as it well can be.  Time was when South Carolina 
guarded this grave as a holy spot.  Now it lies in ruin with her chief city.  
Id. at 5. 
66Id. at 4. 
67THE JUHL LETTERS, supra note 55, at 83. 
68Id. at 82. 
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before the law ran headlong into the persistent racism of white South Carolinians, a 
racism some seemed proud to publicly affirm.  The governor of the state at the start 
of the war, for instance, published a candid pamphlet during the first year after the 
death of the Confederacy.  It was entitled Letter of Hon. Francis W. Pickens: The 
Crops and Conditions of the Country; The Interests of Labor; Effects of 
Emancipation; The Different Races of Mankind.69  His view of equality was none too 
favorable.  “To declare universal equality,” he wrote, “and to enforce it, is to declare 
universal profligacy, and inaugurate universal revolution, plunder and murder.  This 
universal equality and levelling of the human race sprang from the dreamy doctrines 
of Rousseau and Voltaire, overspread Europe, and culminated in the great French 
revolution.”70  It was the conservatism of Robert Emmet’s prosecutors coupled with 
an unyielding racism. 
III. MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE CLOSURE OF THE WAR 
Political justice in the courts of the military was a centerpiece of the policies of 
those responsible for the transition period between the collapse of the Confederacy 
and the reconstruction of the Union.  The function of that transitional justice was to 
close the past. The first of the military trials that set the tone early was the trial of the 
alleged conspirators in the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln.  It was 
followed by the trial of the commandant of the Andersonville prison camp.  That, in 
turn, was followed by the landmark case that has become one of the sources for the 
placement of limitations on military justice: Ex parte Milligan.71  The final case in 
this set has been ignored and with some reason: it was a trial that was never tried.  
This was the case of the President of the defeated Confederacy, Jefferson Davis.  It 
was not without significance, however, and it will be covered below.  The original 
expectation was that Davis would be one of the persons tried in the first case (he was 
named in that trial but was never brought before the court as the evidence placed him 
far out on the margin if it even placed him there).72 
                                                                
 
 
69FRANCIS W. PICKENS, LETTER OF HON. FRANCIS W. PICKENS: THE CROPS AND 
CONDITIONS OF THE COUNTRY; THE INTERESTS OF LABOR; EFFECTS OF EMANCIPATION; THE 
DIFFERENT RACES OF MANKIND (Baltimore, The Printing Office 1866). 
70Id. at 11.  South Carolina newspapers published by whites were generally filled with 
racist points of view.  An example is the following judgment on the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 over President Johnson’s veto, which appeared in the Charleston Daily 
Courier on April 19, 1866: The passage was “iniquitous, unconstitutional and disgraceful to 
Anglo-Saxon blood.  How the heart sickens at the sight of an American Congress—in a land 
of boasted enlightenment and intelligence—placing the wooly-headed Negroes of the South 
upon an equal footing with the white race!” CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, April 19, 1866.  
71Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).  
72ELIZABETH D. LEONARD, LINCOLN’S AVENGERS: JUSTICE, REVENGE, AND REUNION AFTER 
THE CIVIL WAR 83-86 (2004).  The principal witness against Davis turned out to be completely 
unreliable.  He first appeared under the name Sanford Conover, but his real name was Charles 
Dunham.  The most tenacious “avenger” was Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate General.  He 
appears throughout this book to have been a believer in conspiracies and a believer in the 
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The first and most public trial involved the murder of President Abraham 
Lincoln.  President Andrew Johnson caught the mood of the day when he declared 
that, “treason must be made odious.”73  Attorney General James Speed was of a 
similar mind, writing the President shortly after Lincoln’s death that, “I am of the 
opinion that the persons who murdered the President of the United States,” he began 
but caught himself, “or rather the persons charged therewith, can be rightfully tried 
by a military court.”74  President Johnson followed the lead and issued his Order for 
Military Trial of Presidential Assassins on May 1, 1865.75  It was an exertion of 
executive power to settle a crucial jurisdictional problem with an assertion.  Did the 
executive possess the authority to create courts other than Article III courts?  
Johnson’s answer was yes.  The President, moreover, ordered the Military 
Commissioners to establish “rules of proceeding as may avoid unnecessary delay, 
and conduce to the ends of public justice.”76  The trial lasted two months and ended 
with the hanging of four of the defendants on July 7, 1865.77 
John A. Bingham, who prosecuted the case, argued that the crime was not just 
murder.  Bingham was to be the principle author of Section 1 of the 14th 
Amendment with its guarantee of due process of law.78  He was not especially 
concerned with objective rules governing trials in the case at hand, however.  It was 
the murder of the President with the intention of aiding the still smoldering rebellion. 
The rebellion, moreover, “was prosecuted for the vindication of no right, for the 
redress of no wrong, but was itself simply a criminal conspiracy and gigantic 
assassination.”79  Bingham clearly intended to use the military forum to attack the 
war aims of the Confederacy:  “What wrong,” he asked, “had this government or any 
                                                          
 
 
ethical responsibility of persons in power to do everything possible “to sustain common 
people’s basic devotion to the good.”  Id. at 17-18. 
73PETER MASLOWSKI, TREASON MUST BE MADE ODIOUS: MILITARY OCCUPATION AND 
WARTIME RECONSTRUCTION IN NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, 1862-65 (1978). 
74Letter from James Speed, Attorney General, United States of America, to Andrew 
Johnson, President, United States of America (Apr. 28, 1865), in 7 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW 
JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 651, 651 (Leroy P. Graf ed., 1986). 
75Andrew Johnson, Order for Military Trial of Presidential Assassins (May 1, 1865), in 8 
THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 12, 12.  
76Id. 
77LEONARD, supra note 72, at 129-30.  The four executed were Mary Surratt, George 
Atzerodt, David Herold, and Lewis Powell.  Four other defendants were sentenced to the Dry 
Tortugas: they were, Michael O’Laughlen, Samuel Arnold, Edman Spangler and Samuel 
Mudd. Id. at 137-38. 
78WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 49, 66, 78, 115, 145 (1988). 
798 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 499 (John D. Lawson ed., Scholarly Resources Inc. 1972) 
(1917). 
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of its duly constituted agents done to any of the guilty actors in this atrocious 
rebellion?”80 
One of the crucial questions Bingham confronted was jurisdictional, while 
another concerned the authority that authorized the trial in the first place.  Finally, 
there was the question of structure and norms.  On the last point, Bingham claimed 
that the military officers were to be the “sole judges of the law and the fact.”81  There 
would be no jury trial, a fact that Reverdy Johnson, one of the defense counsel, 
argued violated the basic rule of law in its American form.  It was, moreover, not 
needed since the loyal civil courts were open and in “full and undisturbed exercise of 
all their functions” in Washington, D.C.82  The President, in any case, lacked 
constitutional authority to order the creation of a military tribunal.  If a military 
commission created on the mere authority of the President could proceed, nothing 
could stop it from violating the rights secured in the Bill of Rights, especially the 5th 
and 6th Amendments.83  “It [could have] no foundation but in the principle of 
unrestrained, tyrannic power, and passive obedience.”84  It would leave a “nation of 
slaves,” he concluded, without a sense of irony.85 
Bingham’s response was to claim that the Tribunal had no power to declare the 
authority by which it was constituted illegitimate.  “How can it be possible that a 
judicial tribunal can decide . . . that it does not exist . . . ?”86  By what authority did 
the court exist?  It was not an Article III court created by Congress under its 
constitutional power to create courts below the Supreme Court.  “This court,” 
Bingham affirmed, “exists as a judicial tribunal by authority only of the President,” 
and he derived this extraordinary power from the sovereign people whose passive 
obedience legitimized the power.87  Still, one widely accepted premise was that the 
“self-evident truth that whenever government becomes subversive of the ends of its 
creation, it is the right and duty of the people to alter or abolish it.”88  Bingham’s 
dilemma was that this was what Southern leaders claimed as the basis of 
secessionism.  His problem was to uphold the basic constitutional doctrine, and to 
persuasively deny its use in the current situation.  “[D]uring these four years,” he 
argued, the people, who possessed the right of revolution, also had the “right and 
duty, both by law and by arms, that the government of their own choice, humanely 
and wisely administered, oppressive of none and just to all, shall not be overthrown 




81Id. at 498. 
82Id. at 275. 
83See id. at 261-68. 
84Id. at 254. 
85Id. 
86Id. at 505. 
87Id. 
88Id. at 499. 
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by privy conspiracy and armed rebellion.”89  To no one’s surprise, the commission 
rejected the challenge to its authority and proceeded to try the defendants.  On July 5, 
1865, the Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt informed President Johnson of the 
Commission judgments.90  Two days later, four of the defendants were executed.91  
Within a few months, Henry Wirz went on trial for war crimes before a military 
tribunal.  Since he was a military figure, his trial was far less controversial.  I will 
comment on only one issue that arose.  One of the charges against Wirz was that he 
had authorized the use of vicious hounds to run down escapees, and some were 
fatally mauled by the dogs. Wirz defended himself on the ground that Andersonville 
was in Georgia, that Georgia law should prevail, and that under that law, what he did 
was lawful.92  He was arguably right on the last point.  The law of Georgia did allow 
the use of “Negro dogs” to uphold the so-called peculiar institution.  Georgia’s Chief 
Justice, Joseph Henry Lumpkin, ruled in Moran v. Davis that slavery was a divine 
institution and what was necessary to sustain it was legitimate.93  He concluded this 
opinion with an extensive quote from the Book of Revelations.  The court disposed 
of the argument with the observation that prisoners of war were not slaves, and the 
war put an end to the barbarism of slavery.94  The laws of slavery were no more.  
Henry Wirz, of course, was found guilty and executed.95  A far different worldview 
was on the verge of replacing that which perished in the war. 
The Southern laws of slavery96 had collapsed parallel with the closing of the local 
court system.  Along the Sea Islands of South Carolina, the collapse occurred in the 
fall of 1861.97  An exception in South Carolina was the Magistrate-freeholders courts 
which were ad hoc courts called into being to try slaves and free blacks.  By 1865, 
such courts met infrequently, but they did meet.  One example was an inquiry into 
                                                                
 
 
89Id.   
90Letter from Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate General, United States Army, to Andrew 
Johnson, President, United States of America (July 5, 1865), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW 
JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 355. 
91See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
928 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 79, at 820-21; JOHN MCELROY, THIS WAS 
ANDERSONVILLE 300-01 (Roy Meredith, ed., 1957). 
93Moran v. Davis, 18 Ga. 722, 723-24 (1855). 
948 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 79, at 821; MCELROY, supra note 92, at 300.  For 
additional information about Andersonville, the military prison controlled by Henry Wirz, see 
also JOHN MCELROY, ANDERSONVILLE (Arno Press 1969) (1879).  The best historical 
reconstruction of this sad story is WILLIAM MARVEL, ANDERSONVILLE: THE LAST DEPOT 
(1994).  MACKINLAY KANTOR, ANDERSONVILLE (1955), can still be read for its insights into 
the human spirit. 
95MARVEL, supra note 94, at 246-47. 
96See THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860 (1996). 
97See WILLIE LEE ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION: THE PORT ROYAL EXPERIMENT 
(1964).  This remains one of the finest studies within the historiography of Reconstruction. 
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the death of a black in Spartanburg County.  It was the last case heard in that court, 
and it contained a horrid possibility for the future.  Bob, a Freedman, was hanged by 
“unknown persons.”98  Coroner’s inquest juries reached similar conclusions in all too 
many cases in the future.  Another example was in Clarendon County.  On March 19, 
1865, a Magistrate-freeholders court tried Henry, a slave, for the homicide of another 
slave (no consideration of the various forms of homicide was mentioned in the 
record).  He was found guilty and sentenced to 150 lashes and two weeks 
imprisonment.99  Generally, these were exceptions and provost courts replaced these 
occasional ad hoc Southern courts.  
A year later, lower civil courts had replaced the provost courts.  Down to the 
transfer of jurisdiction in October 1866, the provost courts proved more congenial to 
the rights of the Freedmen than Southern whites had; but, the former were still 
inconsistent. They were little better, on occasion, than the white Magistrate-
freeholders courts.  A sample of sentences from the Orangeburg provost court should 
make that clear.  For the crime of larceny, Kit was sentenced to two weeks hard labor 
on bread and water.  Wesley, convicted of stealing a horse in April 1866, was 
sentenced to two months hard labor and to be tied up by his thumbs three times a 
week for two hours each day.  If he was able to return the horse, he would be 
released.100  Sometimes cruelty and sordidness showed up in sentences.  For 
example, Ben, found guilty of larceny, received a one month term to have one-half of 
his head shaved and to stand on a barrel six hours every day for one week.101  Provost 
                                                                
 
 
98State v. Bob, coroner’s inquest (on file in manuscript form with the South Carolina 
Department of Archives and History, Court of Magistrates-Freeholders Trial Papers); Philip 
N. Racine, The Spartanburg District Magistrates and Freeholders Court, 1824-1865, 81 S.C. 
HIST. MAG. 197 (1986). 
99State v. Henry, Mar. 19, 1865, Clarendon County (on file in manuscript form with the 
South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Court of Magistrates-Freeholders Trial 
Papers).  
100Morris, supra note 58, at 21.  
101There were a handful of civil cases with very significant facts and/or results. An 
example is Jethro Gourdin Colored v. Peter G. Gourdin White, Suit for Debt (on file with the 
United States National Archives, Record Group 393, Provost Court Civil Docket, 1867-1868, 
Berkeley, South Carolina).  The Freedmen’s Bureau prosecuted the case in a provost court 
sitting in Berkeley County in August 1867.  Jethro claimed to be the “illegitimate” son of 
Samuel Gourdin, a white planter.  Dr. Samuel Gourdin said Sam had left $50 for his family.  
He also claimed that the Blacks were not freed “by Sam Gourdin, but were given to him as 
Slaves, and that all property belonging to his Slaves became his own.”  Id.  He said that 
Samuel Gourdin “had been assisted in increasing his Slave property by some other chivalric 
Gentleman in the neighborhood.”  Id.  Lieutenant Liedtke in the 43d Infantry and Assistant 
Sub Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau recommended that all possible wills of Samuel 
Gourdin should be examined as he believed Dr. Gourdin was trying to take advantage of 
“these poor people.”  Id.  The finding of the court is an interesting mixture of law and 
presumption.   
After mature deliberation on the evidence . . . considering the fact that under the laws 
of South Carolina nothing could be left in his will by Samuel Gourdin to these people 
they being his slaves though universally known as his own children & the fact that the 
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court justice occasionally spilled over what limitations might exist on their 
discretion.  The larger question was the place of military justice in the American 
legal order.  What were the constitutional limitations on their jurisdiction? 
The question was finally addressed in the spring of 1866, with the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Ex parte Milligan.102  Today, it stands as one of the landmarks of 
constitutional liberty.  Consequently, it was considered by the administration of 
President George W. Bush when he issued his November 13, 2001, executive order 
on the “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism.”103  The fact is that Milligan has not yet proved to be an insuperable 
obstacle. 
Proponents of President Bush’s planned use of Military Commissions cite the 
World War II case involving German saboteurs, Ex parte Quirin.104 The saboteurs 
had removed their uniforms and thereby were treated by the Roosevelt 
administration as enemy combatant noncitizens. Their trial by a military tribunal and 
subsequent execution were upheld because of their noncitizenship.  Nearly all of the 
490 persons held at Guantanamo (as of this writing) are noncitizens captured outside 
the U.S. and particularly in Afghanistan.  They are the people currently at risk of 
                                                          
 
 
Defendant Dr. P.G. Gourdin paid these people the interest on $50 for several years, the 
court is of opinion that the claim is just . . . . 
Id.  “[C]onsidering that $10 ha[d] already been paid,” the court ordered the Defendant to pay 
$40 with 7% interest from January 1862 and to pay the costs of the suit.  Id.  This, of course, 
was an exercise of equitable jurisdiction by a provost court. 
102Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).  
103See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006) (plurality opinion).  The 
President’s effort to set up trials for the detainees at Guantanamo ran into a significant barrier 
on June 29, 2006, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down it’s decision in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.  The opinion for the court by Justice Stevens was a plurality opinion, however.  
Justice Kennedy’s vote supported the conclusion that the commission to try Hamdan was 
illegitimate, but he declined to join all parts of Stevens’ opinion.  Justice Breyer also wrote a 
very brief concurrence to emphasize the point that Congress could authorize the President’s 
action.  Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas wrote the dissent focused on in 
the plurality opinion.  Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justices Scalia, Id. at 2809 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting), and Alito, Id. at 2849 (Alito, J., dissenting), wrote separately, and Chief Justice 
Roberts did not participate since he had participated in the circuit opinion under consideration.  
Id. at 2799 (plurality opinion).  One point I would highlight is that the members of the court 
did try to provide historical authority for their various conclusions.  However, it was here that 
the plurality failed to carry the majority.  “The common law governing military commissions 
may be gleaned from past practice and what sparse legal precedent exists,” is the opening 
sentence of Section V of Justice Stevens opinion.  Id. at 2775.  Section V was not agreed to by 
the majority.  The critical opinion in this regard is that of Justice Kennedy, who saw the issue 
in terms of separation of powers.  He did not reject the value of history; however, he focused 
on different sides of the history.  One of the key points for Kennedy was that “the President 
has acted in a field with a history of congressional participation and regulation.”  Id. at 2800 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  What history and what norms should govern divided the justices 
and hopefully will be probed deeply by scholars in the future. 
104Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).  
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trials by military commissions.  A linchpin in the edifice being erected against the 
noncitizens has been the Quirin case.  Its place in the argument, however, is not as 
firmly settled as it might appear.  Louis Fisher has raised some serious questions 
about its persuasiveness from the point of view of an historian.105  Nonetheless, the 
weight of opinion probably is, for the present, on the side of limiting Milligan to the 
protection of citizens. 
Has Milligan ever been as significant as constitutional historians have claimed?  
It is doubtful in the view of Mark E. Neely, Jr., in his Pulitzer Prize winning book, 
The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties.106  He concluded that it 
“lacked practical influence in protecting liberty,” and, in fact, the real legacy of Ex 
parte Milligan is confined between the covers of the constitutional history books.107  
The decision itself had little effect on history.  One of the leading scholars of 
American political trials, Michal R. Belknap, has argued that President Bush 
probably has a lawful right to authorize such trials.108  He relied on the “inherent” 
powers of the presidency, especially the Commander-in-Chief clause, to authorize 
military trials of civilians.109  However, Belknap believes that the “putrid pedigree” 
of military commission trials makes it “unwise” to do so.110  Louis Fisher has been 
even more expansive.  His book, Military Tribunals & Presidential Power, sweeps 
broadly as his target is the unbounded, expanding institution of the executive in the 
twentieth century.111  Fisher, like Neely, emphasizes the failure of the case to halt 
trials from the spring of 1866 down to 1869 when the military generally drew back 
from direct involvement in the administration of justice.  Both scholars emphasize 
that, during those early years of Reconstruction, there were over one thousand cases 
tried by military commissions, not to mention the trials at the lower level of the 
provost courts. 
                                                                
 
 
105LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL & AMERICAN LAW   
(2003).  Fisher’s principal target was President Roosevelt whose “creation of the military 
commission was deeply flawed.”  Id. at 172.  Not only did he create the commission but he 
interpreted the law of war.  He ignored Congress.  Moreover, the trial record went directly to 
him for review.  A final point I would emphasize is Fisher’s point that Roosevelt’s 
authorization for the tribunal to “make . . . rules . . . as it shall deem necessary for a full and 
fair trial of the matters before it,” got it wrong.  Id. at 173.  “Procedural rules,” Fisher noted, 
“need to be agreed to before a trial begins, not after.”  Id.  The same problem plagues 
Milligan. 
106MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
(1991). 
107Id. at 184. 
108Michal Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration’s Military Tribunals in 
Historical Perspective 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433 (2002). 
109Id. at 442. 
110Id. at 440, 497. 
111LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 176-77 (2005). 
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A different perspective is provided by two legal scholars, Neal Katyal and 
Laurence Tribe.112  Their approach is to test the Bush Military Order by 
“constitutional commands.”113  They do not do much with the history of military 
commissions.  The strength of their work is structural not historical.  It is a strong 
argument.  They conclude that the Constitutional structure creates a “rights-
protecting” political system.114   
A widely held view is that President Bush’s executive order diminishes our 
country in the eyes of the international community.  President Bush has taken action, 
many critics maintain, and defined positions so often in terms of force and war that it 
raises a strong case for describing his policies as militaristic.  It is shameful and 
destructive of our country’s best values.  This is not to claim that there are not 
circumstances under which military justice can be seen as legitimate; but it is to 
argue that Justice Davis occupied higher ground when he intoned that the 
Constitution and the rights it secures applies to times of war as of peace.  The 
President’s critics argue that he does not seem to understand “rights.”  
We are at another delicate point in our history in which the danger of erosion of 
our constitutionally protected rights is surely at least level with the danger during 
World War II.  History can help illuminate the possibilities we face and it can deepen 
our understanding of the nature of communities, rights, and human relationships. 
Upon the topic of the place of justice in our legal world (which includes 
relationships, rights and community), there is more to learn from the history of the 
experiences with military tribunals.  They are a part of the history of our legal order.  
As a contribution to understanding that history better, I want to examine a part of the 
Milligan case that is usually overlooked.  What I propose to do is examine the role of 
precedent in the decision, not the decision as precedent itself.  The modern 
conception of precedent in which judges claim to be bound by earlier authorities was 
not wholly possible until the emergence of authoritative law reports, which occurred 
during the first half of the 19th century.  Prior to that, it was common to find more 
than one report of legal cases.  A prominent example was the Somerset Case in 
which Sir William Mansfield allegedly decided that slavery could not exist in 
England.  The exact boundaries of the decision differ somewhat depending upon 
whose report is read.115 
The modern sense of precedent arose during the first half of the 19th century, 
parallel with the emergence of single, authoritative reports.  The practice of citing 
authorities was not as common as we might expect and arguments among legal 
scholars, treatise writers, as well as judges spanned the century.  One towering figure 
                                                                
 
 
112Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 Yale L. J. 1259 (2002). 
113Id. at 1260. 
114Id. at 1268. 
1152 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1221-44 (1992); William Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and 
the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 88-95 (1974). 
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in the debate was Jeremy Bentham, one of the most prominent of all proponents of 
legal positivism.116  Bentham’s thoughts about precedent went through various 
transformations.  “The coherence of the common law,” one scholar observed of 
Bentham’s jurisprudence, was “supposed to be protected by the requirement that 
judges ‘tread in one another’s steps.’”117  The object of law, it was common to claim, 
was to protect stability in human relationships, to favor protection of expectations, 
and, in the end, to protect property rights.  Judicial lawmaking—often hidden 
beneath such streams of ideas as “natural law,” “reasonableness,” and “policy”118– 
Bentham came to believe, undermined “confidence in the ‘stability of any rules of 
Law, reasonable or not reasonable:  that stability on which every thing that is 
valuable to a man depends.’”119  On the other side, Bentham perceived a different 
danger, and that was the problem that a slavish view of the notion of precedent leads 
to the philosophy of “Whatever is, is right.”120  The Milligan case, then, was decided 
when the Union was still in disarray and the world of legal thought was in turmoil. 
Lambdin P. Milligan was an ardent supporter of the Confederacy from Indiana.  
He was alleged to have been a member of the pro-Confederate Sons of Liberty, a 
group that was supposedly prepared to act on behalf of the South within the 
Midwest.  Actually, the group was never much of a threat, and people like Milligan 
                                                                
 
 
116Frederick G. Kempin Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 
1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28 (1959); A. L. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental 
Law, 50 LAW Q. REV. 40 (1934).  Goodhart argues that the notion of an “absolute authority” 
did not appear “fully developed” until the 19th century.  Id. at 42, 63.  Nonetheless, he 
contends that the idea of a precedent as an authority appeared around the time of Sir Edward 
Coke.  If the precedent cited is not “directly on point” it might still be used but as an analogy 
in judicial reasoning.  To that extent it still might be “quasi-authoritative.”  Id. at 64.  MORTON 
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977), has focused on the  
“retreat from precedent” down to the mid-19th century as judges increasingly used law as an 
instrument to secure and advance commercial and entrepreneurial interests.  Id. at 27.  After 
1850, instrumentalism gave way to formalism.  “Law, once conceived of as protective, 
regulative, paternalistic,” Horwitz claims, “and, above all, a paramount expression of the 
moral sense of the community, had come to be thought of as facilitative of individual desires 
and as simply reflective of the existing organization of economic and political power.”  Id. at 
253; see also PRECEDENT IN LAW (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); RUPERT CROSS & J. W. 
HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW  (4th ed. 1991). 
117SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN, ON THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF LAW 155 (Noel B. Reynolds 
ed., 2005) (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Petition for Justice, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 444, 478 (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1843)). 
118Id.  
119Id. at 156 (quoting Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in A COMMENT ON 
THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT, 391, 409 (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. 
Hart eds., 1977)).  
120Id. at 156 (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM, supra note 117, at 1, 322).  
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became victims in political trials before military tribunals held in Indiana.121  He was 
convicted and sentenced to death in a case that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1866. 
The majority opinion was written by Justice David Davis, joined by four 
members of the court.  Chief Justice Chase wrote for himself and three others.  Davis 
began his consideration of precedent with the nature of man and the “history of the 
world.”122  What this history showed was that the Founders had woven a taught 
fabric that none of the divisions of government could disturb, with the sole exception 
of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.123  Davis moved rapidly and with 
passion through the language of constitutional discourse.  To this point he had cited 
no “precedent” or authority.  What he did was to deepen his construction of the 
political world.  There could always be an “emergency of the times” so imminent 
that some men had to be held against “go[ing] at large.”124  Necessity determined it 
was sometimes acceptable to ignore the rights of some in order to protect “just 
authority and overthrow its enemies.”125  But the only guidance was the provision for 
the temporary suspension of the right to a judicial inquiry though a writ of habeas 
corpus.  The Constitution, he observed, 
does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied a citizen, that he shall 
be tried otherwise than by the course of common law . . . the lessons of 
history informed [the Framers] that a trial by an established court, assisted 
by an impartial jury, was the only sure way of protecting the citizen 
                                                                
 
 
121FRANK L. KLEMENT, DARK LANTERNS: SECRET POLITICAL SOCIETIES, CONSPIRACIES, 
AND TREASON TRIALS IN THE CIVIL WAR (1984). 
122Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866). 
123Id. at 125.  The writ of habeas corpus cum causa, the form of the writ known as the 
Great Writ of Liberty was a centerpiece in the Civil War and Reconstruction.  This writ 
mediated claims to personal liberty and the needs of the state, especially during periods of 
violence.  There was a virtual pamphlet war during the Civil War over the writ.  This struggle 
can be approached through UNION PAMPHLETS OF THE CIVIL WAR 1861-1865 (Frank Freidel 
ed., 1967).  An earlier pen was EDWARD INGERSOLL, THE HISTORY AND LAW OF THE WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS WITH AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF GRAND JURIES (Philadelphia, T.K. and P.G. 
Collins 1849).  The principal prewar American treatise was ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON 
THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE 
CONNECTED WITH IT: WITH A VIEW OF THE LAW OF EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVES (Albany, W.C. 
Little & Co. 1858).  An intricate example of the possible political use of habeas corpus 
occurred in Tennessee in 1867.  Judge Thomas Frazier, a judge of the Davidson County 
Criminal Court, issued a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the forceful seizure of some 
legislators who had been taken to the legislature to make up the number of legislators needed 
as a quorum to act on ratification of the 14th Amendment.  For his attempted interference he 
was impeached.  See PROCEEDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT OF IMPEACHMENT, IN THE CASE OF THE 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE VS. THOMAS N. FRAZIER, JUDGE, ETC.  BEGUN AND HELD 
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, MONDAY, MAY 11, 1867, at 74 (Nashville, S.C. Mercer 1867). 
124Milligan, 71 U.S. at 125. 
125Id. 
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against oppression and wrong.  Knowing this, they limited the suspension 
to one great right, and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.  But, it is 
insisted that the safety of the country in time of war demands that this 
broad claim for martial law shall be sustained.  If this were true, it could 
be well said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal 
principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation.126 
Nonetheless, Davis was prepared to admit some legitimacy to martial law, but it 
required that real “necessity . . . be actual and present; the invasion real, such as 
effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”127  He then 
reframed the point and concluded that “[m]artial rule can never exist where the 
courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.”128 
It was at this point that Davis turned to authority.  “We are not without 
precedents,” he began.129  They were in “English and American history” and even 
though they illustrated his views, he believed it “hardly necessary to make particular 
reference to them.”130  Despite the relative insignificance of precedent or legal 
authority, Davis did make a cursory examination of them.  His first “precedent” was 
a case of attainder of the Earl of Lancaster in the reign of Edward III (it ended in 
1377).131  His next reference was that “down to the present day, martial law, as 
claimed in this case, has been condemned by all respectable English jurists as 
contrary to the fundamental laws of the land, and subversive of the liberty of the 
subject.”132 As far as English legal authority was relevant, that was the end of the 
matter.  
He did turn to English colonial law with a brief reference to the case of the 
Reverend Smith in Demerara and, more to the point, Lord Brougham’s 
condemnation of the judicial murder in the 1824 parliamentary debate.133  From 
there, he shifted to the American Revolution and the condemnation of British use of 
martial law by the revolutionaries.134  He then moved to the War of 1812 and 
mentioned, without identifying them, that there were four cases regarding military 
trials of civilians when the civil courts were open.135  Next came Luther v. Borden, 
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135Id. at 128-29. 
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only to be dismissed as authority.136  The end of the excursus was near.  “We do not 
deem it important,” Davis wrote, “to examine further the adjudged cases; and shall, 
therefore, conclude without any additional reference to authorities.”137 
It was not a masterpiece of legal reasoning or historical reconstruction, but it was 
revealing in laying open the weakness of the rule of stare decisis in the face of a 
strong political argument.  It also showed that American forms of adjudication were 
moving in different channels from the English.  According to P. S. Atiyah and 
Robert Summer, two modern legal scholars, English judges are more inclined to 
emphasize adherence to form while Americans are more willing to go for the 
substance.138  Davis’s opinion, moreover, can be used as a strong affirmation of 
“rights,” despite its limited, even slightly shabby, foundations in legal authority. 
Chief Justice Chase added nothing to the discussion of precedent. His opinion 
was more concerned with political theory.  Here, it might be worth emphasizing that 
counsel arguing the case cited all kinds of historical circumstances and numerous 
cases they hoped would influence the final judgment.  Counsel and Justices were 
moving within somewhat different languages and with different sources of law and 
authority.  Chase wrote to emphasize that there was a legitimate congressional power 
to authorize military tribunals.139  He did so with links to the general sense of 
community.  “We have no apprehension,” he wrote, “that this power [to authorize 
military commission trials], under our American system of government, in which all 
official authority is derived from the people . . . is more likely to be abused than the 
power to regulate commerce, or the power to borrow money.”140  He made no 
reference to definitions found in statutes or common law authorities.  
The final case in this set that looked toward the past was the case that was never 
tried, the case of Jefferson Davis.  There would be no trial by military tribunal for 
Davis.  There were procedural delays, assertions by Chief Justice Chase that he 
would not sit on a trial in a district under martial law, and even delays because of 
conflicts in schedule.  But there was a telling hearing in a federal court in the Fourth 
Circuit in 1868, after which no more was heard but a whimpy entry in the records of 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Most of what we know of his case appeared in 1876 at the 
end of Reconstruction.  Bradley T. Johnson of the Virginia bar prepared a volume 
entitled Reports of Cases Decided by Chief Justice Chase in the Circuit Court of the 
United States for the Fourth Circuit.141  It was revised and corrected by Chase 
himself.  One hundred twenty four pages were devoted to the Jefferson Davis case.  
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Perhaps the real explanation of the final failure to try Davis for anything can be 
found in the following remark of the court reporter:   
Trials for treason in the civil courts are not remedies adapted to the 
close of a great civil war.  Honor forbids a resort to them after combatants 
in open War have recognized each other as soldiers and gentlemen 
engaged in a Legitimate conflict. . . . It would be shockingly indecorous 
for the ultimate victor in such a conflict to send his vanquished opponent 
before the civil magistrate to be tried as if he were a mere thief or rioter. . . 
. What honor forbids in an individual, policy prohibits in a government.142   
Within the Southern worldview of the mid-19th century, as Bertram Wyatt-Brown 
has argued, honor was central.  Jefferson Davis was, by all accounts, an honorable 
man.143 
Nevertheless, a federal grand jury indicted him in May of 1866 for having joined 
with others to violate their obligation of obedience to the Federal Union.  The 
beginning of the end of the case was a hearing in November of 1868 to quash the 
indictment.  O’Conor, counsel for Davis, grounded his argument on the motion to 
quash on an interpretation of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment.144  This may have 
been the first reliance upon that Constitutional Amendment, one of the most vital in 
our constitutional history.  If so, there is irony galore since the U.S. Supreme Court 
held—in its first full consideration of the sweep of the Amendment—that it was 
limited to cases arising out of slavery and its abolition.  It was ironic indeed that the 
first beneficiary of an Amendment to protect and extend rights to the Freedmen 
should be the deposed President of the Confederacy. 
O’Conor’s argument was that the prohibition on holding office under Section 3 
for certain persons was a punishment, and it had the implicit affect of a repeal of 
earlier statutes on treason, insurrection, and rebellion.  It was the latest expression of 
the will of the people and showed an intention to avoid a harsh policy toward 
Confederates.145 Richard Henry Dana, Jr., for the prosecution, argued that Section 3 
was not to punish but was incidental to the purpose of ensuring that governance was 
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144U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.  
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
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such disability.  
Id.  
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in the hands of the people.146  A “constructive repeal,” Dana argued, did not work 
because the offenses of treason and rebellion were not the same.147  Interpretive rules 
required a “positive repugnance” to affect a repeal.148  On December 5, 1868, Chief 
Justice Chase certified a disagreement to the U.S. Supreme Court.  No further 
proceedings were ever held.  At the end of 1868, President Johnson issued a General 
Amnesty.  The court reporter noted that from that point on, “the certificate of 
disagreement rest[ed] among the records of the Supreme Court, undisturbed by a 
single motion.”149  As a parting shot, Chase instructed the reporter to note that his 
position on the disagreement was in favor of the motion to quash and that all further 
proceedings were barred by the 14th Amendment.150 
IV. RESTORATION OF ORDER AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
Scholars agree that the power of the federal government expanded relentlessly 
during the Civil War and Reconstruction.  With the spread of industrial and then 
financial capitalism, the rush of authority to the federal level flowed like a stream 
after a torrential downpour.  The shifting of trials from state to federal courts was 
significant.  We should be mindful of the fact that federalism, as a political theory, 
and localism, as a daily reality for Americans, did not disappear.  All of these beliefs 
and values were in dynamic tension.   
Anthropologists deserve considerable credit for turning our attention to this with 
their work on smaller communities to grasp the ways human beings act and react.  
“Thick description” and “local knowledge” are methods used by some 
anthropologists, such as Clifford Geertz, to unravel the meaning in rituals, games, 
work patterns, conceptions of debt and so on.151  Legal historians have seen the 
wisdom of unraveling local practice as well.152  Such a focus on the actual practice of 
military courts at the level of local provost courts as well as the more public military 
                                                                
 
 
146Id. at 105. 
147Id. at 103.  See generally id. at 91-105.  Counsel for Davis argued for a “constructive 
repeal,” that is, that Section 3 of the 14th Amendment provided for the punishment for Davis 
and others similarly situated.  A prohibition on office holding was a serious punishment for 
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insurrection and rebellion. 
148Id. at 103.  
149Id. at 124. 
150Id.  
151CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGY (3d ed. 2000). 
152Examples of legal historians following this methodology are William A. Blair, Justice 
Versus Law and Order: The Battles over the Reconstruction of Virginia’s Minor Judiciary, 
1865-1870, 103 VA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 158-80 (1995); Wayne K. Durrill, Political 
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Reconstruction, 70 J. S. HIST. 577-602 (2004). 
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tribunals help us understand the possibilities open to white and black South 
Carolinians at the end of the war.  The end of slavery left an emptiness in authority 
that encouraged a period of violence that the army of occupation had to deal with, 
and it overlapped with the collapse of Confederate authority.  A revealing case was 
heard, for instance, four days before the execution of the Lincoln conspirators.  
Edward W. Andrews was tried by a Military Commission sitting in Orangeburg, 
South Carolina.  The court consisted of five officers, presided over by a Lieutenant 
Colonel, who was an officer in the United States Colored Troops.  Andrews was 
allowed an attorney, William Legare.  The charge against him was that he had 
murdered Cromwell Bright near Four Hole Swamp on May 18, 1865.153 
The trial opened with a plea in bar of trial for want of jurisdiction in the 
commission.  The argument was that the commission had no jurisdiction over acts 
done before the establishment of martial law, and that martial law alone could give it 
legitimacy.  To do otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws.  Moreover, the arraignment before this court violated the 
5th Amendment promise of due process and the 6th Amendment jury trial 
guarantee.154   The act of killing was lawful when done. “There existed,” Legare 
argued, “at the time [of the killing,] an organized body of men, a provost guard for 
the country, legally constituted and charged with the execution and preservation of 
law, of which body the accused was a member, and to which alone he was 
responsible for his acts . . . .”155  To sustain the argument would have required the 
court to recognize the legality of a Confederate provost guard and the legitimacy of 
its actions.  The court did not sustain the plea to the jurisdiction.156 
The testimony showed that the members of the so-called guard suspected that 
Cromwell Bright had stolen a horse.  Cromwell and his son were being held at a farm 
when Andrews arrived.157  He argued that “an example must be made.”158  He was 
asked if any court or magistrate was available to hear the case.  The answer was no, 
as it would have been throughout much of the state.159  There were occasional 
                                                                
 
 
1531 EDWIN M. STANTON, LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-11, at 
2-3 (1st Sess. 1866).  The document communicates, “[i]n compliance with a [Senate] 
resolution . . . copies of the records and proceedings . . . of the Military Commissions . . . 
which . . . tried and convicted E. W. Andrews, of South Carolina; J.M. Brown and C. C. 
Reese, of Georgia; [and] J. L. McMillan and Neill McGill, of North Carolina.”  Id. at 1.  See 
also KENNETH RADLEY, REBEL WATCHDOG: THE CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY PROVOST 
GUARD (1989).  There is no mention of the Andrews case, or the alleged leader of the “guard,” 
Frederick, in Radley’s study. 
154S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-11, at 3-4.  
155Id. at 3. 
156Id. at 4. 
157Id. at 5. 
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magistrate-freeholders courts held, however, no one on the Military Tribunal asked 
about the possibility of calling upon a magistrate-freeholders court.  Confederate 
authority was gone and that was that. 
The trial proceeded.  It was established that Andrews took the Brights to Four 
Hole Swamp where he told Cromwell to say his prayers as he was going to kill him.  
While on the ground praying Andrews shot him.160  Israel Bright provided some of 
the crucial evidence.  Legare argued that he was incompetent because he was a slave 
at the time of the “execution” and the rules of evidence of South Carolina should 
govern.161  The evidentiary claim was brushed aside by the Tribunal as quickly as the 
Commission had done in the Wirz trial.162  The tribunal trying Andrews turned to the 
question of the “legitimacy” of the “execution.”163 
Down to the surrender of Confederate General Joseph Johnston, the men in the 
case at hand had been a part of the Confederate army.  After the surrender, they 
reconstituted themselves as a provost guard.  Mr. Frederick, the leader of the guard, 
denied that it was “the intention of the company to set aside the [s]tate and common 
law of the land.”164  Necessity, he claimed, validated a deviation from common law 
rules.  It could justify shooting someone summarily, he argued.165  Asked for an 
example of necessity, he answered, “If I was to catch a man stealing, and I could not 
stop him in any other way, I would execute him, of course.”166  Perhaps even more 
revealing was this: “Question. Was one of the duties of this patrol to guard 
plantations, and keep Negroes from leaving them? Answer. Yes, sir.”167  The 
Confederacy had fallen and during the transition to occupation by the federal army. 
Southern whites turned to what they knew to protect the social order that was 
crumbling all around them.  The Commission may have been sensitive to the chaotic 
situation as it chose to find Andrews guilty of manslaughter, because the “malice” 
required for a conviction of murder had not been established. The Tribunal, in short, 
may have used basic concepts of English common law.  Even if that is true, a 
problem remains, and that is the meaning of “malice.” 
The difficulty can be illustrated with a look at two works on the law of homicide.  
The first is Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Homicide in the United States, 
published in 1855.168  Wharton’s approach exuded certitude about the meaning of 
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“malice.”169  He cited an English treatise by Sir William Russell.  “Malice,” Russell 
observed, was a common law word meant to refer to a “wicked, depraved, and 
malignant spirit; a heart regardless of social duty, and deliberately bent on 
mischief.”170 
The second book on that law is Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of 
Homicide in the United States, published in 1875.171  Wharton began with the same 
opening definition but then uncertainty entered: “So far . . . as this definition is 
distinctive it is inconclusive.”172  Malice, he now thought, was a term that required 
“peculiar exposition and limitation.”173  His final judgment was this:   
We must reach . . . a . . . conclusion: if the sagacity of our jurists working 
on this important topic for so long a series of years has been unable to 
construct a terse, satisfactory definition of homicide, this is because such a 
definition cannot, from the nature of the thing to be defined, be 
constructed.  In order, therefore, to understand what murder is, we must 
study the subject in the concrete.174 
Violent death from weapons and disease had become so common in the lives of the 
Civil War generation that it left imprints all over law.  Andrews was one who 
benefited from the changing perceptions and definitions.  He was sentenced to serve 
ten years in the Albany penitentiary in New York. 175 
The rules governing such trials at that time required approval by the Commander 
of the Military District in which the trial had been held.  The commander in 1865, 
General John P. Hatch, disapproved.  He returned the case and asked the tribunal to 
give it more “mature deliberation.”176  He also ordered the court to explain why the 
judgment was not “guilty of ‘murder.’”177  The case was reconsidered, the 
manslaughter decision was upheld, and—this time—General Hatch approved.178  The 
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next step was submission of the case to the Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt.  
Holt was so angry that he recommended a severe reprimand for all the commission 
judges.179  His thinking was this: “The murder was undoubtedly committed under the 
influence of that brutal contempt for the lives and rights of the Negro race [that 
prevailed] with certain classes of the [S]outh, and in fanatical defiance of the 
government which has taken that race under its protection.”180 Racism had led to a 
murder and the killing had been justified because of a claimed, but illegitimate, 
necessity. 
On the other side, many South Carolina whites signed a large petition urging 
mercy for Andrews because he was a very dim witted person.181  Holt was not 
moved—it would not excuse or reduce culpability.  Rather, it was more evidence of 
the “benumbing influence upon the moral sense of the system of forced labor in the 
midst of which the prisoner has been brought up, and the manifestations of which it 
is the bounden duty of this government inexorably to punish.”182  Racial slavery and 
its legal supports, along with its stunted moral code, were to be uprooted and 
replaced by a free market society.  Military trials would be used in the destruction of 
an old and repressive social order as they were in the Scottish Highlands a hundred 
years before. 
The next case, In re Egan, however, should have raised concern about the whole 
process of liquidating the war and beginning Reconstruction.183  It was a Military 
Commission trial of an 80 year-old man from Lexington County in the upcountry.  
He was found guilty of shooting a “[N]egro boy” to death in September 1865, and 
sentenced to life in the Albany Penitentiary.184  While in the New York prison, he 
appealed to Justice Samuel Nelson of the U.S. Supreme Court, who was serving his 
federal circuit court duties.  Nelson ruled that the trial was improper because it 
occurred months after the surrender of the Confederate armies and the opening of the 
local courts.185  The case was heard about the time that the U.S. Supreme Court was 
deciding Milligan.  Egan was discharged and never tried again. 
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A final case I want to mention is Ex parte Crawford Keyes.186  It was the last in a 
series of early cases tried in military tribunals in South Carolina that reached the 
federal court level.  It arose in October 1865 when Keyes, along with his sons and a 
couple of their friends, went on trial for the murder of three union soldiers at a 
crossing of the Savannah River.187  The soldiers were guarding cotton claimed by 
Keyes but held at the time by agents of the Treasury Department.188  Race was not an 
issue in this case, but the limits of violence that carried over from the prewar South 
doubtless was.189  Keyes was not a dim young thug like Andrews.  He was a 
prominent person in Anderson Court House.190  A later congressional investigation of 
this case showed that he was a very active, even notorious member of a local 
“vigilance committee” during the war.191  That did not automatically prejudice the 
occupation leaders against him, however, as he was appointed to a provost court set 
up by the Union army of occupation.192  In any event, Keyes was found guilty of 
murder and sentenced to death by the military commission.193  His case became a 
cause celebre among prominent white South Carolinians.  The list of supporters 
included James L. Orr, the governor elected under presidential Reconstruction.194  
President Johnson bowed to the pressure from such sources.  He commuted the death 
sentence to time in the Dry Tortugas, where those found guilty in the Lincoln 
assassination—but not of a capital offense—had been sent.195 
Milligan changed the ultimate outcome in the Keyes case.196  Milligan was 
wedged in between the original trial of Keyes and the emerging political domination 
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of Reconstruction by radical Republicans in the fall elections of 1866.  Southern 
whites had self destructed with the adoption of harsh Black Codes, and race riots in 
places such as New Orleans and Memphis—both of those major riots were in the 
summer of 1866.197  Within South Carolina, the action of one of the district judges, 
A. P. Aldrich, added to the negative view of the course of white Southerners.198  This 
confrontation involved one of the symbols of the slave South—the whip.  Whips and 
slavery were intertwined, but so were whips and authority.  Authority to use force for 
“correction” of those who bore a subordinate relationship to another was spread 
across the pages of the law books of the South, as well as the metropolis and other 
colonies.  William Green observed that under the apprenticeship system the English 
adopted as a transition in the West Indies, the whip occupied an anomalous position 
at law.199  “Punishments,” he wrote, were “mitigated during apprenticeship, and in 
some colonies the whip was entirely abandoned.”200 Moreover, “[w]here it was not 
[immediately] retired, it was allowed only as a form of judicial punishment.”201 
The issue of the whip as judicial punishment arose in 1866 in South Carolina, 
when Judge Aldrich imposed the sentence of whipping on a white man in a larceny 
case in Charleston.202  General Daniel Sickles refused to allow the punishment and 
issued a military order prohibiting the whip thereafter.  Aldrich was a strong-willed 
racist who also believed in a conservative respect for the law of his state. He refused 
to acknowledge the subordination of state law to the authority of the military.  He 
would be suspended from office a year later after he refused to enforce a jury order 
issued by the General commanding, E. R. S. Canby.203 
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It was within the context of growing hostility that the final acts in the Keyes case 
were played out.  Following the commutation, Keyes was transferred to Delaware 
and brought before a U.S. District Judge.204  The Judge issued a writ of habeas 
corpus to examine the imprisonment and ruled the trial by military commission 
illegal.205  Keyes was freed, making a triumphant return to Anderson Court House 
where the populace greeted him with a large picnic.206 
Keyes’ case had one more act.  It was investigated by a congressional committee 
which concluded that “unless substantial justice is done the laboring classes 
hereafter, and to the Union men and northern men who desire to go there to engage 
in business enterprises, no improvement in the state of affairs can reasonably be 
expected.”207  Market capitalism—“business enterprise”—defined the possibilities in 
the South.  That meant recognition of the need for order, security, and stability of 
expectations.  The place of labor, overwhelmingly former slaves, remained unsettled. 
Equality before the law for labor was the still unattained objective. The result of 
these aspirations was the shift away from the presidential form of Reconstruction 
that left initiatives to the former Confederates, and the emergence of a more radical 
Military Reconstruction that began in March 1867. 
There were some signs, however weak, that Southern whites were prepared to 
move toward a more progressive legal order. The provost courts that heard most 
cases involving African Americans turned pending cases over to civil courts in 
October 1866, and white South Carolinians held civil courts down to the spring of 
1867.  General Sickles’s report on this experience was optimistic: the superior 
courts, he wrote, showed a “conscientious respect for law,”208 although he admitted 
that there had been some “irregularities.”209  A coroner’s jury at Hilton Head 
concluded in one case that some freedmen had met their death “by means to the jury 
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unknown.”210  The “irregularity” was that the killers were on the coroner’s jury.211  
Nonetheless, Sickles’s report was optimistic as he noted that “tranquility and order 
have been restored under martial law” and that “[c]apital, enterprise, and population 
are coming from the [N]orth.”212 
V. THE RADICAL TURN 
Republicans swept the elections in the fall and moved with dispatch thereafter.  
By March 1867, they passed a Military Reconstruction Act that wiped out or 
delegitimized the provisional Presidential governments.  The law then divided the 
South into five military districts, provided for the enfranchisement of black males, 
and imposed “political disabilities” on leading whites that removed them from 
Reconstruction until Congress removed the disabilities. 
The army of occupation was at the center of this congressional phase of 
Reconstruction.  During the early summer, the sole job was registration of those who 
were enfranchised under the Military Reconstruction Act.  It was largely a 
ministerial undertaking.  They would administer the oath required and keep lists of 
those eligible to vote on a proposed convention to draft a new state constitution.  
They did exercise some judgment because persons who sought registration could be 
challenged as not qualified or excluded.  At the outset, General Sickles was the 
commander in the Second District, which included the Carolinas.  He was replaced 
early by General E. R. S. Canby, who oversaw the registration.  The District had a 
Bureau of Civil Affairs headed by A. J. Willard. 
One of his earliest opinions concerned this question: What were sufficient 
grounds for rejecting a person from registration to participate in the election?213  
Willard’s approach was to categorize the reasons registrars had listed beside the 
name of persons challenged.  The process, it was clear, was chaotic and needed 
organization.  The result of the approach was a series of tables of reasons that were 
subdivisions of the two basic categories—sufficient and insufficient.  This was 
followed by a brief, but intricate opinion by Willard.  Among the insufficient reasons 
that appeared beside people’s names were “commissioners of roads, clerk of district 
court, held executive office, deputy marshall, marshall, clerk of state senate, 
members of secession convention . . . commissioner in equity, judge advocate, 
custom house officer . . . justice of the peace, officer patrol . . .[and so on].”214  On 
the other side were a variety of facts sufficient to reject a person:  
hiring horses to confederate soldiers . . . invested in confederate bonds, 
furnishing horses to rebellion by sale, encouraging men to enlist . . . 






213Opinions of the Chief of the Bureau of Civil Affairs (on file with the United States 
National Archives, Record Group 393, Records of the Second Military District). 
214Id. 
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encouraging war by speeches . . . Opposing Reconstruction in Private & 
Public violent Secesh . . . Convicted of hunting U. S. prisoners with dogs . 
. . bad rebel . . . voted for appropriation of $10,000 for the widows and 
orphans of confederate soldiers.215   
Table G under sufficient reasons was an interesting potpourri: “Could not take the 
oath, convicted of burglary, convicted of rape, convicted of murder, born in Africa, 
too old (over 100 years), insane, pauper, oath to Confederate government, disloyalty, 
publicly whipped, would not take off his hat to qualify or swear, Cherokee Indians, 
[and] Murdered two freedmen.”216 
Willard’s opinion set forth some “general principles” so that there would be 
consistency throughout the District.  The first principle was that when the name of an 
officer was used, it should be inferred that the office was held before the war.  One 
of the more interesting “principles” concerned the use of felonies.  “The commission 
of a felony,” he wrote, “is not ground of disqualification in itself. It is being 
convicted of felony in a court of competent jurisdiction that constitutes 
disqualification.”217 Willard concluded with a list of offices that would be sufficient 
to reject a person if it was held before the war and the person thereafter engaged in 
rebellion.218 
The result of the registration process was the registration in South Carolina of 
123,056 people.  The vote on whether a convention should be called to draft a 
constitution was this: 68,768 in favor, 2,278 opposed and 57,010 abstained.219   
Down to the summer of 1868, the military remained in control and acted with greater 
boldness than it had in its first phase that ended in October of 1866.  Its activities can 
be followed in the final report by Canby to the Secretary of War on August 31, 
1868.220    
One of Willard’s opinions, for instance, involved racial discrimination by law.  
His opinion was a response to a question he received from Marion, North Carolina.  
The question was whether the state laws on marriage licenses was to be applied to 
blacks.  His opinion was that  
the civil rights bill as the Supreme law of the land supplied the defects of 
the laws of North Carolina in regard to proceedings where Blacks are 







2193 MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS 
TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE 
FORTIETH CONGRESS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-1, pt. 1, at 340 (3d Sess. 1868).  
220Id. at 337.  The Canby report should be used in conjunction with Willard’s opinions for 
the Bureau of Civil Affairs.  See Opinions of the Chief of the Bureau of Civil Affairs (on file 
with the United States National Archives, Record Group 393, Records of the Second Military 
District). 
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concerned, and [no] instructions seem to be required to enable the blacks 
to claim the advantages of all laws relating to whites from officers acting 
under local law.  The same is true of all restrictive legislation by virtue of 
the civil rights bill; it applies instantly to blacks without further 
legislation.221   
Equality before the law—it was a heady policy generally opposed by white 
Carolinians, but it was adopted with firmness by the military leadership. 
One of the most dramatic public confrontations over the notion of equality began 
as early as May 1867.  It ended, in a sense, in October of that year.  It involved what 
Canby considered the most important reform in the Second Military District, it 
involved the “modification of the jury system” in the Carolinas.  Each state presented 
different problems.  The social structure and mores differed a great deal, and the 
laws reflected that.  North Carolina was filled with smaller farms and few huge 
plantations.  South Carolina was a state with a slave system spread throughout and 
one of the wealthiest planter classes in the South along the coastal rice region.222 
What Canby found was that “in North Carolina the qualification of a juror was 
determined by the possession of a freehold estate, and in South Carolina, . . . by the 
color of the citizen.”223  Canby’s solution was to order the jury list to include all 
citizens “who were identified with the community in which they resided by the 
payment of taxes, and who were mentally and morally qualified for the performance 
of jury duty.”224  The courts were “empowered to purge the jury lists of all persons 
who were personally unfitted by reason of mental or moral incapacity.”225 
Generally, white South Carolinians groused about the jury order but it was in the 
hands of those who issued orders for the calling of jurors to act.  Only one judge 
chose to openly resist, and his resistance led to his removal from the bench—that 
was Judge A. P. Aldrich, who had already had a confrontation with the military over 
the issue of whipping as a lawful punishment.  He now claimed that he faced a 




222The tasks the military faced were determined in part by the nature of slavery in the 
various divisions of the Carolinas.  There is much literature on slavery and masters along the 
coastal districts.  The following are reasonable starting points for the reader: PETER A. 
COCLANIS, THE SHADOW OF A DREAM: ECONOMIC LIFE AND DEATH IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA 
LOW COUNTRY 1670-1920 (1989): STEPHANIE MCCURRY, MASTERS OF SMALL WORLDS: 
YEOMAN HOUSEHOLDS, GENDER RELATIONS, AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE  
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA LOW COUNTRY (1995);  WILLIAM DUSINBERRE, THEM DARK 
DAYS: SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAN RICE SWAMPS (1996);  THE SOUTH CAROLINA RICE 
PLANTATION AS REVEALED IN THE PAPERS OF ROBERT F.W. ALLSTON (J.H. Easterby ed., 1945); 
JULIE SAVILLE, THE WORK OF RECONSTRUCTION: FROM SLAVE TO WAGE LABORER IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 1860-1870 (1994). 
223H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-1, pt. 1, at 337. 
224Id. at 338. 
225Id. 
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conflict between Canby’s jury order and his own official oath to uphold and defend 
the 1831 jury law of South Carolina.   
Believing as I do that the present Congress is an usurping body, and that 
its [sic] attacks upon the co-ordinate departments of government, and the 
United States and State constitutions, are fast reducing the country to the 
condition of party vassalage, I cannot retain my self respect, 
conscientiously perform the obligations of my oath of office, and lend my 
aid to support and perpetuate the tyranny of which we complain.226   
He concluded his defiant statement as follows: “The juries have been drawn, 
impaneled [sic], and summoned, in obedience to the jury law of South Carolina, 
whose judge I am.  I am now ready to proceed with the call of the dockets.”227  
He was suspended from office, but he made a last dramatic appearance at 
Barnwell Court House on October 21, 1867.  In a crowded courtroom, he read the 
relevant documents on the jury order, pronounced the order unconstitutional, and 
rose from his seat and announced that he gave up his seat “for the present,” in 
“forced obedience” to Canby’s order.228  “The time is at hand,” he announced, “when 
we will be relieved from the tyranny and insolence of military despotism.”229 
Drama was one thing, but for the present, South Carolina was on a course to the 
creation of a new government committed to equality before the law.  Its foundation 
was in the Congressional Reconstruction laws of March 1867 and its supplements.230   
From March 1867 to the summer of 1868, the orders of the military would be the law 
of South Carolina: local courts would function but at the sufferance of the army 
commander, and military courts once again heard cases. 
Possible ways to achieve equality before the law included an imaginative use of 
English common law norms.  A striking illustration was a criminal case heard by a 
military tribunal in August 1867 at the military post in Newberry, South Carolina.  
Canby’s report to the Secretary of War a few months later did not develop this case, 
but it was telling nonetheless.  The defendant was B. J. Ramage who was the local 
agent for the Greenville and Columbia Railroad Company.  The charge against him 
was a violation of a General Order that the federal Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to 
be the law in the Second Military District.  Ramage violated the order when he 
refused to sell a first class ticket to Benjamin F. Randolph, a politically active 
African American who had been sent south by the American Missionary 
Association.  He nettled some white South Carolinians with the demand for equality 
                                                                
 
 
226Id. at 349. 
227Id. at 350.  
2282 MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS 
TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE 
FORTIETH CONGRESS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-1, pt. 1, at 307 (2d Sess. 1867).  
229Id.  
230FAIRMAN, supra note 182, at 253-365. 
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
550 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:511 
 
 
of rights—so much so that over a year after the Ramage case he was murdered by the 
KKK.231  
In 1867, Randolph told Ramage that he “would claim it as a right” to buy a first 
class ticket under the military order.232  Ramage refused. He was summoned to 
appear before a military tribunal where he pled guilty and read a statement.  The 
rates and regulations of the railroad were governed by the order of his superior on the 
railroad, and he was but an agent.  In October 1866, at the time that the first phase of 
military justice ended, the superintendent set up a rate schedule based on race and 
age.  Ramage concluded his statement with a plea: “I would wish the tribunal to 
understand that my refusal to sell the said B. F. Randolph a first class ticket was not 
through malice or prejudice on account of caste or color nor to show a disposition to 
disobey orders [from the military] but simply,” in pursuit of instructions.233 His 
agency defense did not protect him and no charges were leveled against his superior.  
Ramage was ordered to pay a fine or serve fifty days.  The sentence was approved 
and then clemency was granted because Ramage did not intend to violate the military 
rule on equality.  The case amounted to an application of English law on common 
carriers—such a carrier was required to “deal with its customers equally, [and] 
charge a single set of rates.”234 
Progressive possibilities were surfacing during those vital months. Some are 
easily overlooked, partly because they did not survive the Reconstruction period, but 
they are revealing all the same.  An example that derived from English landlord-
tenant law was the remedy of distress for rent.  This was a remedy that was not 
uniformly beloved among South Carolina judges before the war.  Judge Elihu Bay, in 
Youngblood v. Lowry, for instance, was upset by this private remedy that allowed 
landlords to go onto rental property and seize and sell any property found there in 
order to cover rent due and still unpaid.235  American states had generally abolished 
the remedy, but South Carolina law-makers, among the more conservative in the 
country, had left it intact.  Distress for rent was but one of the self help remedies in 
their slave society; another was the right of recaption of fugitive slaves.  That right 
was raised to the level of a federal constitutional right by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania.236  South Carolinians usually did not favor intrusion into 
                                                                
 
 
231On Randolph see ERIC FONER, FREEDOM’S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK 
OFFICEHOLDERS DURING RECONSTRUCTION 175-76 (Louisiana State University Press rev. ed. 
1996).  Randolph was free born and educated at Oberlin in Ohio.  He served as a Presbyterian 
minister and preached as a Methodist in 1866.  Id. 
232Proceedings of a Military Tribunal (on file with the United States National Archives, 
Record Group 393, proceedings of a military tribunal, U.S. v. Ramage, August 1867, 
Newberry, South Carolina, 1-10). 
233Id.  
234Id.  
235Youngblood v. Lowry, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 39 (S.C. 1822). 
236Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
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rights claimed by slaveowners.  An exception was the state prohibition on in-state 
manumission.237 
The military leaders in South Carolina, however, did not favor self-help remedies 
like recaption and distress for rent.  The first allowed the seizure of a person—it 
ended with the end of slavery. The second allowed the seizure of property in his 
possession.  By General Orders No. 32, landlords were given a lien on the crop of 
tenants.  Liens had to be enforced in courts so that the self-help remedy was in 
danger.  Willard was formally asked for an opinion about the impact of the order on 
the distress for rent.  The answer was that it repealed it.238  Lest any doubts remain, 
the new radical government, established in 1868, passed a law on attachments.  It 
was brief, stating, “Distress for non-payment of rent, as heretofore existing, is 
abolished.”239 
One final reform I would like to mention that occurred under military rule in 
these years came in the area of criminal law.  It did not occur with great fanfare, but 
it was a very important transformation in the common law of crimes nevertheless.  It 
involved the law of burglary.  Before the war, South Carolina clung to traditional law 
as much as possible, and burglary (often enough a charge against slaves) was a good 
example.  Today, most people would answer that it is a crime against property, 
which (for the most part) probably reflects the current state of the law.  As market 
capitalism spread, burglary became more and more to be seen as a property crime 
only.  But, that does not capture the common law view of this crime.  
Only two crimes were considered mixed offenses in that they were crimes against 
persons and against property, and they were seen as especially dangerous.  Both 
crimes involved crimes against dwellings during the nighttime.  The offenses were 
burglary and arson.  Blackstone linked them in a chapter on “Offences against the 
Habitations of Individuals.”240  The crimes had to be during the nighttime because 
the element of moment was the danger and the terror of nighttime invasions into a 
                                                                
 
 
237Youngblood, 13 S.C.L. at 39; MORRIS, supra note 96, at 371-423. 13 WORDS AND 
PHRASES PERMANENT ED. 5 (1965) says the following of the distress for rent in arrears:  It is 
one of the most ancient, as well as one of the most efficient, of the landlord’s remedies 
for the collection of rent.  It is a right sui generis, belonging to the landlord whenever 
the relation of landlord and tenant exists.  It is the right to distrain or levy upon all the 
goods upon the demised premises, whether those of the tenant or of a stranger . . . .  It 
belongs to that small category of personal rights, the assertion of which has always 
been independent of legal procedure. 
Id.  See also Prigg, 41 U.S. 539. 
2383 MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS 
TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE 
FORTIETH CONGRESS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-1, pt. 1, at 342-43 (3d Sess. 1868) (General 
Orders No. 32, May 30, 1867). 
239Act of Sept. 24, 1868, No. 51, § 20, 1868 S.C. Acts 101, 105 (Spec. Sess. 1868).  It was 
the last section of a long and intricate law adopted by the Congressional Reconstruction 
government.  
240BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 220-28. 
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person’s “castle.”  When James L. Petigru worked on a possible codification of the 
law of the state during the early years of the war, he did not recommend major 
departures from the common law.241  
Elsewhere, however, burglary had been separated from arson and had become 
more and more a crime against property (not so much a crime against “habitation”).  
When the military considered the issue of jurisdiction between military tribunals and 
provost courts, it granted sole jurisdiction over murder, rape, and arson to the 
tribunals—burglary was not listed among those serious offenses.242  For the moment, 
                                                                
 
 
241H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-1, pt. 1, at 343-44. 
242Id. at 353.  For a sample of crimes see the following table, supplied by Canby. Id. (Any 
disparity in numbers is due to the fact that some cases involved more than one defendant). 
Statement of the number of trials by military commissions and other military tribunals 
in the second military district from January 1, 1867, to June 30, 1868. 
Crimes Charged. Cases Tried. Guilty. Not Guilty. 
  Whites. Blacks. Whites. Blacks. Whites. Blacks. 
Murder 4 15 3 3 1 12 
Manslaughter -- 3 -- 2 -- 1 
Arson 2 3 2 -- -- 3 
Assault, intent to kill 21 6 18 4 3 2 
Assault, intent to 
commit rape 
3 -- 3 -- -- -- 
Assault and Battery 61 13 53 8 8 5 
Highway Robbery 4 1 4 1 -- -- 
Burglary 5 4 5 4 -- -- 
Larceny 43 55 38 47 5 8 
Riot 21 7 11 7 10 -- 
Malicious trespass 8 7 4 5 4 2 
Concealing Stolen 
Property 
10 2 7 1 3 1 
Obstructing Railroads 9 -- 1 -- 8 -- 
Perjury -- 1 -- 1 -- -- 
Holding illegal court 1 8 1 8 -- -- 
Selling Liquor to 
soldiers 
41 7 38 7 3 -- 
Selling Liquor without 
a license 
44 9 43 9 1 -- 
Distilling Liquor in 
violation of military 
order 
3 -- 2 -- 1 -- 
Preventing registration 
or voting 
11 2 -- 2 11 -- 
Carrying concealed 
weapons 
54 27 50 23 4 4 
Miscellaneous 23 12 20 10 3 2 
Id.  
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it aroused no loud public reaction.  It was apparently a transformation whose time 
had arrived. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By the end of the Reconstruction period, there had been significant changes in 
the law of South Carolina: the military had tried to establish a legal order in which 
everyone was entitled to security in a society resting upon legal equality.  This had 
not been the measure of the first phase of Reconstruction during which the military 
was involved in the restoration of order.  What was missing in the wake of 
Confederate failure was a clear commitment to equality.  What filled the void left by 
the end of the Confederacy was a political murkiness of purpose, mixed with a 
measure of racism and a pragmatic effort to secure current crops.  Military justice is 
a legitimate part of a legal order, but it is defined by its nature and by the demands 
upon it.  It is the starkest form of legitimated force that exists because of serious 
threats to the continued existence of the state.  It is necessary, in other words, as a 
matter of state necessity.  Its bare purpose is to reestablish or maintain order in a 
disordered time.  Its legitimacy is necessity and its necessity is defined by others.  It 
is, in that sense, an instrumental violence that exists somewhere around the margins 
of a legal order. Because of its nature, it can be used and its necessity judged as 
moral or immoral, just or unjust.  It can be used as an instrument to carry out policies 
of forceful uprooting of an “unjust” social order.  That was the claim of those who 
ended the feudalism in the Scottish Highlands and those who ended racial slavery in 
the American South.   
Under some historical experiences, it can also mean the “absolute destruction” of 
the people in rebellion.  A prominent example was German military culture in a 
colonial world.  Its suppression of the Herero uprising in Southwest Africa at the turn 
into the 20th century was in violation of then existing international law in its 
cruelty.243  Arguably, the British suppression of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya 
during the 1950s was also beyond the boundary.244   
None of these samples occurred in historical vacuums, of course.  Insofar as the 
American South at the end of slavery and the outset of Reconstruction is concerned, 
an intricate legal heritage defined part of the boundary around military justice.  There 
was little time or space, however, for a careful and well-understood use of legal rules 
and traditions, especially for untrained military personnel who sometimes sat on the 
provost courts from day to day.  Many of those who sat on the Military Tribunals did 
know law. The question is, what law?  This question is followed by another: What 
did it matter in the work of the military in occupation?  Sometimes those who sat on 
these courts wrung their hands in despair over the questions of what law, and with 
what affect?  In some cases—Gourdin v. Gourdin to take one example—the court 
                                                                
 
 
243See ISABEL V. HULL, ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE PRACTICES 
OF WAR IN IMPERIAL GERMANY (2005). 
244See DAVID ANDERSON, HISTORIES OF THE HANGED: THE DIRTY WAR IN KENYA AND THE 
END OF EMPIRE (2005); CAROLINE ELKINS, IMPERIAL RECKONING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
BRITAIN’S GULAG IN KENYA (2005). 
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admitted that the laws relating to slaves before the war governed relationships and 
the interpretations of personal rights and duties.  It then found an equitable way 
around it.245 
Presidential Reconstruction began in the fall of 1865, within a legal world filled 
with notions about loyalty and the genuine worth of oaths.  President Johnson used 
the military to administer the oaths of allegiance.  Congress sought to punish treason 
through a confiscation of property.  But there were limitations as well.  Thaddeus 
Stevens, a Pennsylvania Congressman, believed that the Southern aristocracy had to 
be destroyed through the break up of large landholding tracts.  The fragments would 
be distributed to Southern loyalists and Freedmen.  That was too radical a dream for 
Northerners to support.246 
Time also placed significant limits upon the possible ways open to lawmakers.  
The first session of the 39th Congress did not meet until December 1865.  Until then, 
Reconstruction was a presidential prerogative.  As time would tell, the new 
constitutions drafted and the provisional governments created left too much 
discretion in the hands of the defeated Confederates.  Southern whites would have an 
opportunity to direct Reconstruction, but with Black Codes, riots, and unbending 
hostility to the specifics of the Northern war aims, the only likely result was a failure 
of self-Reconstruction.  There is, moreover, evidence that whites used existing law to 
hold back the growth of significant “rights.”  An example is the March 16, 1867, 
report of E. W. Everson, Assistant Adjutant Inspector General.247  He reported that 
the white magistrate at Edgefield told him that there was a “widespread strategy to 
refuse to issue warrants.”248  The excuse was that the “freedmen could not furnish the 
required security.”249   
South Carolina law still used the notion that the state action in cases of crime 
began with a private complaint leading to an arrest warrant.  The law provided that 
the complainant had to provide security before a warrant of arrest would issue.  The 
white magistrate showed Everson how it worked.  His example involved Elijah 
Wilson, a white man, who slashed Bob Griffin, a freedman, from his ear to his nose 
with a knife.  Griffin could not get a warrant of arrest because he could not provide 
security, so no case developed.250 
What replaced the approaches of the early months was a range of legal and 
constitutional possibilities that included use of legal categories and legal notions as 
various as the common law rules on common carriers, landlord-tenant law, the 
                                                                
 
 
245See supra note 101. 
246HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND 
POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901, at 47 (2001). 
247Letter from E. W. Everson, Assistant Adjutant Inspector General, to H. W. Smith, 
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel & Assistant Adjutant General (March 16, 1867) (on file with the 
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common law on domestic relationships, and statutory innovations.  It all fell apart as 
those Southern whites, who were bitterly opposed, turned to violence.  In the end, 
violence proved to be the effective solvent used to defeat efforts at Reconstruction.  
Southern whites also used extraordinary remedies, including quo warranto, 
mandamus, and impeachment.251  
The end of Reconstruction involved an intricate interplay of legal rights and 
remedies with a bloody mix of racial violence.  That is another story.  What I have 
endeavored to address here is the role of the military in the first few years following 
the military defeat and surrender of the Confederacy. 
Walter Benjamin, in his Critique of Violence noted that there was a “lawmaking 
character inherent” in violence.252  Former Confederates understood that.  They 
understood that violence also affirmed law.  Violence, in other words, was a means, 
not an end in itself.  It could sustain the destruction of an old legal order, or it could 
be used to turn away from progressive legal transformation.  This is what happened 
in the late 1870s.  With their victory over radical Reconstructionists in the elections 
and subsequent legal actions in 1876-1877,253 South Carolina’s white conservative 
lawmakers tried to recapture a world lost in the massive bloodletting of the Civil 
War.  Among the first acts adopted by the redemptionist state legislature were: “An 
                                                                
 
 
251On the extraordinary remedies see HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL 
REMEDIES OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION, HABEAS CORPUS, CERTIORARI, AND QUO 
WARRANTO (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1880). An example of the use of one of these 
extraordinary remedies is the REPORT OF THE TESTIMONY IN THE CASE OF IMPEACHMENT 
AGAINST MONTGOMERY MOSES, JUDGE OF SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (Columbia, Republican 
Printing Co. 1876). 
252Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in 1 WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS 
1913-1926, at 236, 240 (Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., 1996); see also 
BEATRICE HANSSEN, CRITIQUE OF VIOLENCE: BETWEEN POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND CRITICAL 
THEORY (2000).  These are contributions at a high level of abstraction.  For a more immediate 
approach, one that is focused on law, see NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS 
OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).  There are also numerous memoirs by 
leading figures in the movement to oust radical Republicans and recapture power for whites. 
No one surpassed Benjamin Tillman in his boastfulness about the role of violence in bringing 
Reconstruction to an end.  Tillman was a governor of the state, and later a United States 
Senator.  Around the turn of the century Tillman brought out his own work: BENJAMIN 
TILLMAN, THE STRUGGLES OF 1876: HOW SOUTH CAROLINA WAS DELIVERED FROM CARPET-
BAG AND NEGRO RULE: SPEECH AT THE RED-SHIRT RE-UNION AT ANDERSON: PERSONAL 
REMINISCENCES AND INCIDENTS (1909) (copy on file in the South Caroliniana Library).  His 
opening remarks on the Hamburg riot were these: “Judge Aldrich told you last night that he 
could tell more about the Hamburg riot than I could because he would not have to criminate 
himself.  As for that, I have nothing to conceal about the Hamburg riot.  I told the republicans 
in the [U.S.] senate that we had to shoot negroes to get relief from the galling tyranny to which 
we had been subjected . . . .”  Id. at 14. 
253See Livingston v. Wells, 8 S.C. 347, 365 (1877).  It will provide a start to following the 
numerous and sometimes very intricate set of cases that shows beyond doubt that American 
“exceptionalism” is a myth. 
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Act to Restore the Remedy of Distress for Rent,”254 “An Act to Prevent and Punish 
the Intermarrying of Races,”255 and “An Act to Repeal an Act Entitled, ‘An Act to 
Regulate the Granting of Divorces’” (divorce had been impossible before 
Reconstruction, and it was now impossible again).256 
Finally, two statutes read together reveal a great deal about the values and 
sentiments that were seething beneath the surface as the military tried to establish 
order and equality, the radical Reconstruction hope.  The first law was passed in May 
of 1877.  It repealed a law passed to deal with a facet of KKK violence: “An Act to 
Repeal an Act Entitled, ‘An Act for the Relief of the Widows and Orphans of 
Persons Killed Because of Their Political Opinions.’”257  The second law was passed 
two years later, and I will end with this, “An Act to Provide Artificial Limbs for all 
Soldiers of the State who Lost Their Legs or Arms During Military Services in the 
Years 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864 and 1865.”258   
The values of the old South had proven to be firm, the memories of honor strong, 
and the racial savagery as vigorous as ever.  The importance of the conscious use of 
history, that is, of “memory,” emerged as a theme fairly early into the period of 
                                                                
 
 
254Act of Mar. 18, 1878, No. 474, 1878 S.C. Acts 511 (Reg. Sess. 1877-78). 
255Act of Dec. 12, 1879, No. 5, 1879 S.C. Acts 3. (Reg. Sess. 1879). 
256Act of Dec. 20, 1878, No. 591, 1878 S.C. Acts 719 (Reg. Sess. 1878). 
257Act of May 23, 1877, No. 204, 1877 S.C. Acts 223 (Extra Sess. 1877).  For the repealed 
law, see Act of Mar. 13, 1872, No. 161, 1872 S.C. Acts 206 (Reg. Sess. 1871-72).  See also 
CHARLESTON NEWS & COURIER, May 5, 1877.  In the judgment of the Courier the repealed law 
“was an unmitigated job, and gave excellent opportunities of turning a dishonest penny to the 
Radicals who manipulated the fund.”  Actually, the repealed law was a striking change in 
South Carolina law.  One of the sources for the notion that the victims of a violent political 
upheaval were entitled to some recompense was the response in London to the Lord George 
Gordon riots.  The Proceedings at large on the Trial of George Gordon, esq., in 21 A 
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER 
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, supra note 18, at 
485-652 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816).  Gordon was tried for High Treason.  The riots were among 
the most well-known of all riots in English history.  CHARLES DICKENS, BARNABY RUDGE 
(New York, Harper 1875) (1841), is a novel about the Lord Gordon riots.  The issue appeared 
in South Carolina when Willard issued an opinion for the Second Military District.  Willard’s 
opinion in the Second Military District was on a claim for damages that her store absorbed 
during a riot in Charleston.  The city government refused to provide her relief.  Willard ruled 
that her claim be investigated to determine whether she “has sustained damages by violence at 
the hands of an unlawful assemblage of persons.”  Opinions of the Chief of the Bureau of 
Civil Affairs (on file with the United States National Archives, Record Group 393, Records of 
the Second Military District). 
258Act of Dec. 24, 1879, No. 184, 1879 S.C. Acts 186 (Reg. Sess. 1879).  Perhaps even 
more revealing was a statute passed in December 1880.  It required all persons elected to the 
General Assembly and all officers required to take a general oath before taking office, to take 
an additional oath.  “I do solemnly swear . . . that I have not, since the first day of January, A. 
D. 1881, engaged in a duel . . . .”  Act of Dec. 24, 1880, No. 410, § 3, 1880 S.C. Acts 501, 502  
(Reg. Sess. 1880).  
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radical Republican rule.  On December 19, 1872, the Edgefield Advertiser published 
a piece summarizing a meeting of the Survivor’s Association.  The President of the 
association was General Wade Hampton, soon to be the state governor.  The senior 
vice-president was General Kershaw, and the Secretary was A. C. Haskell, soon to 
be a member of the state Supreme Court.  The purpose of the Association was to 
“collat[e] statistics and preserve[e] records of the past, and thereby furnish[] material 
for the preparation of the history of our people in which, at least, justice may be done 




                                                                
 
 
259EDGEFIELD ADVERTISER, Dec. 19, 1872.  On memory in these years see DAVID W. 
BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2001).  See also Act of 
Jan. 31, 1882, No. 550, 1882  S.C. Acts 737 (Reg. Sess. 1881-82) (“An Act to provide for the 
preparation of rolls of troops furnished by the State of South Carolina to the army of the 
Confederate States and of the militia of the State in active service during the war between the 
Confederate and United States.”). It provided for the collection of the names of all South 
Carolinians who fought for the Confederacy as well as a “brief history or sketch of each and 
every regiment, battalion, battery, or squadron” and so on.  Id. at 737.  
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